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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to design a secure and optimized cryptographic stream cipher
for passive type Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags.
RFID technology is a wireless automatic tracking and identification device. It has become
an integral part of our daily life and it is used in many applications such as electronic passports,
contactless payment systems, supply chain management and so on. But the information carried
on RFID tags are vulnerable to unauthorized access (or various threats) which raises the security
and privacy concern over RFID devices. One of the possible solutions to protect the confiden-
tiality, integrity and to provide authentication is, to use a cryptographic stream cipher which
encrypts the original information with a pseudo-random bit sequence. Besides that RFID tags
require a resource constrained environment such as efficient area, power and high performance
cryptographic systems with large security margins. Therefore, the architecture of stream cipher
provides the best trade-off between the cryptographic security and the hardware efficiency.
In this thesis, we first described the RFID technology and explain the design requirements
for passive type RFID tags. The hardware design for passive tags is more challenging due to
its stringent requirements like power consumption and the silicon area. We presented differ-
ent design measures and some of the optimization techniques required to achieve low-resource
cryptographic hardware implementation for passive tags.
Secondly, we propose and implement a lightweight WG-5 stream cipher, which has good
proven cryptographic mathematical properties. Based on these properties we measured the secu-
rity analysis of WG-5 and showed that the WG-5 is immune to different types of attacks such as
algebraic attack, correlation attack, cube attack, differential attack, Discrete Fourier Transform
attack (DFT), Time-Memory-Data trade-off attack. The implementation of WG-5 was carried
out using 65 nm and 130 nm CMOS technologies. We achieved promising results of WG-5 im-
plementation in terms of area, power, speed and optimality. Our results outperforms most of the
other stream ciphers which are selected in eSTREAM project.
Finally, we proposed RFID mutual authentication protocol based on WG-5. The security and
privacy analysis of the proposed protocol showed that it is resistant to various RFID attacks such
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Cutting edge technologies have made recent advances in microelectronics. One of the most
advanced and widely used technologies is wireless, non-contact automatic system or Radio Fre-
quency Identification (RFID) [2]. It was first introduced during World War II, since then, it has
become an integral part of our daily lives. Nowadays, RFID tags are used in various applica-
tions such as, item tracking, contactless smart cards, access control, e-passports, supply chain
management and so on [3]. The use of this technology by some of the major companies like
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and the US military forces agency have greatly increased the popularity
and demand of RFID systems.
RFID systems consist of mainly three components; tags, which can store information or
data; readers, which is used for reading the data from the tags; back-end database system which
is connected to readers via network for the processing of tag’s data. Generally, the information
stored in RFID tags are in the form of unique code called as Electronic product code (EPC) and
is available in various lengths (96, 108 bits) [4] [5] depending upon the application.
Based on their power sources RFID tags are differentiated into Passive, active and semi pas-
sive. In the current work we focus on the passive type RFID tags. Passive tags do not contain
batteries unlike semi passive and active tags. Passive tags extract power from the reader via elec-
tromagnetic waves which makes it small and less expensive. The size of the tag varies depending
on applications. Due to the technological advancements in semiconductor manufacturing, re-
searchers are shrinking the size of RFID tag which further reduces its cost. With the increasing
applications and high demands, RFID systems must full fill some of the design goals such as low
cost, small size and higher data rates.
The aim of the present work is to propose a lightweight stream cipher called WG-5 for the
low cost passive RFID tags. WG-5 is a variant of WG stream ciphers [6], which was submitted to
eSTREAM project in 2007. Further, it was focused as a multi-output WG ciphers (MOWG) [7]
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wherein, its trade offs between the security and hardware matrices were discussed. In [8], WG-7
has been proposed as a lightweight stream cipher and its software implementation was carried out
on different micro controller units. In the present work, the design goal of WG-5 stream cipher is
to ensure cryptographically secure and to achieve hardware implementation efficiently in terms
of less gate count, low power and better performance using the current CMOS technologies.
The next goal is to propose a mutual authentication protocol based on the proposed lightweight
stream cipher. Further, the proposed protocol must be secure against some of the attacks such as
man-in-the-middle, denial of service, tampering of tags and also to ensure RFID privacy.
1.1 Motivation
The major concern in RFID systems is security and privacy. Usually, RFID tags communicate
data in the form of unique code, to the readers, over an unsecured communication channel. The
unique code can be related to manufacturer details of any product or it can be personal informa-
tion. The security and privacy issues arise in RFID systems when the unique code are accessed
by an unauthorized readers by eavesdropping or rogue monitoring. This leads to manipulation
of tags data, tracking the objects or persons. To overcome the aforementioned concerns, cryp-
tographic solutions or alternatively symmetric cipher cryptosystems are introduced in low cost
passive RFID tags.
The silicon area utilization of the passive tags is directly proportional to the cost of the tag
and according to one of the previous studies, the cost of the passive tags should not exceed five
cents [9]. Based on current advanced CMOS technologies, the design of cryptographic circuitry
for RFID tags should not be more than 5000 GE (gate equivalence) [10] [11]. The symmetric
stream ciphers can be implemented in RFID tags with less than 5000 GE [12].
Since passive RFID tags receive their power from the reader, the power consumption is an
important factor to be considered. The power consumption usually vary depending on the tag
operations performed such as; transmission rate, response time and writing the data into tags
memory [10]. Generally, the power available for cryptographic design in passive tag should be
in the range of 5 to 15 µA [10] [13]. Therefore, passive tags have very limited power availabil-
ity to perform the aforementioned operations. Thus, one can envisaged that, the implementation
of symmetric cryptosystem in low cost passive tags would be a challenging task due to its con-
strained environment. The cryptographic designs which achieve these RFID passive design goals
such as less area, low power and low cost are called lightweight cryptography.
In addition, single authentication protocols are one of the solutions to ensure security and
privacy in RFID systems which ensures that, the data is communicated between the two autho-
rized persons. If the tag authenticates a reader it means that the data is sent only to the authorized
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reader. Similarly, if the reader authenticates a tag, it suggests that the tag is not forged by any
unauthorized entities. Moreover, compared to single authentication protocols, the mutual au-
thentication protocol is more secure way of communication in which both the reader and the
tag authenticates each other before exchanging the data. Most of the authentication protocols
published are based on block ciphers or other cryptographic systems such as hash functions [14]
[15] [16] [17] [18] and very few protocols are based on stream ciphers [19] [20].
1.2 Organization
In chapter 2, we discuss the background information on various cryptographic systems and their
properties. In addition, we explain different types of attacks that an adversary can perform over
a cryptographic system. In chapter 3, we describe the overview of mathematical concepts like
finite fields, polynomials, normal, polynomial and optimal normal basis which play an important
role in designing a symmetric stream ciphers. Since, the design of stream cipher depends on
the selection of basis we explain various options that can be selected depending on the hardware
requirements in section 3.4. Later in section 3.5, we discuss the LFSR properties and its hardware
representation for any given polynomials over a finite field.
In chapter 4, we discuss the overview of stream ciphers and different types of attacks on them.
In section 4.5, we describe the WG stream cipher [6] and its proven cryptographic properties.
WG stream cipher is based on the mathematical definitions and the keystream is generated based
on its WG transformation function which are explained in section 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 respectively.
Since, WG transformation function can be implemented in different architectures, the procedure
for selecting the parameters for its implementation were explained in section 4.5.5. The impor-
tant parameters that are involved in design of WG stream cipher are number of bits over the finite
field, primitive feedback polynomial, generating polynomial, length of the LFSR, representation
of field elements either in normal or polynomial basis or ONB, multiplier architectures like serial
or parallel based depending on the selection of basis. These parameters can affect the security
level of WG cipher and utilization of hardware resources of the cipher.
In chapter 5, we gave an overview of RFID systems, its applications, different frequency
bands, EPC structure and standards. The main focus of this chapter is to explain the security
hardware design requirements for passive type RFID tags. Section 5.5, explains the role of cryp-
tographic solutions, RFID optimality metrics, RFID hardware design considerations and different
optimization techniques for passive type RFID tags. Finally, section 5.6 and 5.7 describes some
of the RFID privacy goals and definitions and explain different types of attacks on RFID systems
respectively.
In chapter 6, we propose lightweight stream cipher WG-5 for low cost passive RFID tags.
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After selecting the design parameters for WG-5, we describe the architecture of WG-5 keystream
generator and calculated the related properties of WG-5 in section 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. Based
on the measured properties we carried out the security and privacy analysis of WG-5 stream ci-
pher in section 6.3. Later, we carried out the implementation details of WG-5 cipher starting
with the datapath i.e. WG-5 core and then the control units; LFSR and FSM in section 6.4. Fur-
thermore, we measured the implementation details of WG-5 cipher using 65 and 130 nm CMOS
technology in section 6.5. In section 6.6, we proposed RFID mutual authentication protocol
based on WG-5 stream cipher and its security and privacy analysis has been carried out in sec-
tion 6.6.1. Atlast, we compared the WG-5 results with other existing stream and block ciphers
in section 6.7.




The communication over an insecure channel can be accessed by unauthorized persons. In order
to prevent from unauthorized accesses, cryptography is widely used in different applications.
Cryptography provides few of the security objectives which is discussed in section 2.2. In section
2.3, the types of cryptosystems such as symmetric and asymmetric key systems are discussed. In
cryptography, hash functions and digital signatures play an important role in achieving some of
the security objectives, which is explained in section 2.4. In order to achieve high level of security
few of the cryptographic protocols has been described in section 2.5. While, in section 2.6 the
concept of pseudo-randomness is discussed. Atlast in section 2.7 different types of possible
attacks on the cryptographic systems are discussed.
2.1 Keywords
Keywords: These are the following keywords listed below which are used throughout this ma-
terial.
• Information: It can be a data or a message which is communicated between two-parties.
The parties can be either a person or a computer terminal.
• Sender: Sender is one of the two-parties, who transmits the information.
• Receiver: Reciever is also one of the two-parties, who receives the information.
• Attacker/adversary/eavesdropper: An unauthorized party who tries to get access to the
secure communication channel used by the sender and receiver.
• Channel: It is a means of communication between the sender and receiver. Channels can
be secure and unsecured. Secure channel does not allow the attacker to modify, delete, insert or
read the information, compared to unsecured channel.
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• Confidentiality or Secrecy: Assurance for the data or information that is communicated
and cannot be accessed by any unauthorized parties.
• Cryptography: Study of mathematical techniques which deal with the information secu-
rity. It enables the confidentiality, when information is communicated via unsecured channel.
Cryptographic algorithms are designed by mathematical techniques to introduce security.
• Cipher: Any encryption technique referred as a cipher. Formally, its a technique of con-
cealing the readability and meaning of the original information.
• Cryptographic system: Its a collections of various cryptographic algorithms which includes
ciphers and cryptographic protocols.
• Cryptanalysis: A technique used for deciphering the information, without any knowledge
of enciphering details. Persons who work on cryptanalysis are called as attackers or cryptana-
lysts.
• Entity: An entity can be referred to as person or computer terminal.
2.2 Objectives of cryptography
The main goal of cryptography is to prevent and detect the fraud from the malicious activities.
Cryptography not only provide better security over the communication channels but also provides
following services.
1. Confidentiality: It ensures that when the information is transmitted over a channel and not
accessed by any unauthorized person.
2. Data Integrity: It ensures the ability to address the manipulation of original data.
Manipulation can be either insertion, modification or deletion.
3. Authentication: It ensures the ability to identify or to verify the communicating parties so
that, no one should be able to pretend as Alice and send an information to Bob (data origin
authentication). Alice and Bob should be able to identify each other (here Alice is a sender and
Bob is a receiver) (entity authentication) [21]
4. Non-repudiation: It prevents from denying the previous commitments or actions done by the
communicating parties.
2.3 Overview of Cryptosystem
It is a collection of various cryptographic algorithms which includes ciphers and various cryp-
tographic protocols. The model of the cryptosystem is shown in Figure 2.1. There are three
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parties involved in the cryptosystem called as transmitter, receiver and adversary. Initially the
transmitter chooses a plaintext message before it transmits over a channel. Generally commu-
nication takes place over an insecure channel before transmitting to the legitimate receiver. In
order to avoid malicious activities by the adversary about the plaintext; the transmitter transforms
the plaintext into unknown format known as ciphertext with the help of a secret key (sequence of
bits). The process of transformation is known as encryption. Before transmitting the information,
the sender must share the secret key with the receiver by means of some secure channel. Once
receiver knows the secret key and recovers the plaintext message by applying the transformation
called as decryption over the ciphertext.
Transmitter
Encryption   




  Secure channel
Decryption   
   system Receiver
Figure 2.1: Cryptosystem
Encryption algorithm is a transformation or substitution of steps while, decryption algorithm
is just a reverse run of it. Usually, the secret key and the plaintext are inputs for the encryption
algorithm. Secret key values are independent of the plaintext and the encryption algorithm pro-
duces various outputs for different secret key values. For secure cryptosystem one should design
a strong encryption algorithm and choose the secret key wisely. For example, the secret key
must be long and possess randomness properties so that, the adversary should not decrypt the
ciphertext and discover the secret key.
There are two types of cryptosystem which are as follows. If the sender and receiver uses
the same secret key for encryption and decryption operation, then the system is called as the
symmetric key or single-key or conventional cryptosystem [22]. If both the sender and receiver
uses two different keys thats is public-key (non-secret) and private-key(secret) for encryption and
decryption then the system is called as asymmetric key ,two-key or public-key cryptosystem.
2.3.1 Symmetric key cryptosystems
Symmetric-key cryptosystems provide secure communication between a pair of communication
parties and the adversary who tries to intercepts the message (m) cannot get any significant
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information about the message contents. In this system both the sender and receiver share the
same secret key (k) for both encryption (E) and decryption (D) operations.
Example: If Alice wants to send a message m to Bob through a secure communication
channel. Using encryption algorithm, Alice first generates ciphertext (C) as E(k,m) = C
and sends it to Bob. Bob on the other side, using decryption algorithm he restores the original
message as D(k, C) = m.
Typically, symmetric key cryptosystems are used for ensuring the confidentiality and integrity
of the data. One way to achieve data integrity is by using message authentication code (MAC)
algorithm [23]. In this algorithm, first the sender generates the MAC code which is a simple
block of data that is generated depending on the message length using secret key by running the
MAC algorithm. The message along with the MAC code are sent to the receiver and the receiver
would check the integrity of the incoming message by running the same MAC algorithm and
comparing the transmitted MAC code. If the code is identical then the receiver can assure that
there is no modifications done to the message.
Example: If Alice wants to send a message m to Bob, then Alice generates MAC code as
X = MAC(k,m) using MAC algorithm. Usually the MAC code is protected by a secret key k.
Now Alice sends X along with m to Bob. At the receiver side Bob verifies the data integrity of
the message by checking the MAC code.
Symmetric key cryptosystems are of two types; Stream ciphers and Block ciphers and ex-
plained below.
Stream ciphers:
In stream cipher the plaintext is converted to ciphertext by one bit at a time. It generates arbitrar-
ily long stream of key material (bits) known as keystream. The generation of keystream output is
based up on the internal state which is usually hidden inside the cipher and changes frequently as
cipher operates. During encryption the keystream is XORed (exclusive-or operation) with each
plaintext one bit at a time. Some of the examples of stream ciphers are Welch-Gong (WG) cipher,
RC4, grain, trivium, A5/1 and so on.
Block ciphers:
Block cipher operates on the fixed length blocks (i.e. group of bits) of plaintext or ciphertext.
The encryption operation is an unvarying transformation, which is controlled by using the secret
key. For example, a block cipher might take 128-bit block of plaintext as an input and generate
128-bit block of ciphertext. Examples of block ciphers are Data Encryption Standard (DES),
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and so on.
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2.3.2 Asymmetric key cryptosystems
Public key cryptosystem is a well known example of asymmetric key cryptosystem. The concept
of public key cryptosystem was mainly introduced to distribute the secret keys securely, which
is also known as key agreement scheme [21]. The basic idea behind the public key cryptosystem
is that, each person contains two different keys one is called the public key (pk) and the other is
called the private key or secret key (sk). The public key is available to everybody where as, the
secret key is kept secret and it is known only to the owner. The public key is used for encrypting
the message while the private key is used for decryption.
Example: In public key cryptography Alice uses Bob’s public key for encryption operation
as E(pk,m) = C and sends ciphertext to Bob. Bob on the other hand recovers the message from
ciphertext, using his secret key by decryption operation as D(sk, C) = m.
From the above example we need to know that only Bob knows the secret key and nobody
can decrypt the message, even Alice cannot decrypt the message back even if she has lost the
message. This system provides better confidentiality of the data.
The well known examples of public key algorithms are RSA (named after its inventors:
Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) and Diffie–Hellman algorithms.
2.3.3 Symmetric vs asymmetric key cryptography
1 . Symmetric key systems provide secure communication channel whereas asymmetric-key
systems are good at secure key exchange management.
2 . Design of symmetric key systems are easy to analyze and implement in hardware imple-
mentation compared to asymmetric. Because, symmetric key systems consists of simple mathe-
matical operations involving addition, subtraction and multiplication operations. and these oper-
ations can be implemented by using simple XOR and AND gates in hardware. Where as, public
key systems consists of hard complex mathematical operations which involves addition, multi-
plication and division or inversion, which utilizes more number of gates for implementation, for
example elliptic curve crypto systems.
3 . Length of key for symmetric-key ciphers are relatively short compared to asymmetric-key
systems.
4 . To ensure better security various cryptographic mechanisms like pseudo-random num-
ber generators, digital signatures use the concepts of both symmetric-key and asymmetric-key
system.
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2.4 Other cryptographic primitives
In this section we discuss about two algorithms; hash functions and digital signatures. In cryptog-
raphy these are used to ensure data integrity and authentication. Hash functions are considered
as one of the encryption algorithms like secret key and public key algorithms and known as one-
way encryption systems where no secret keys are used. Whereas, digital signatures use concepts
of public key cryptosystems and ensure non-repudiation by using hash functions.
2.4.1 Hash functions
Cryptographic hash functions takes a block of message as an input and returns random bit string
of fixed length known as hash value. The hash value will change if the input message is altered
intentionally or accidentally.
Cryptographic hash function properties
1. For any given message, it is easy to compute hash value.
2. For any given hash value, it is infeasible to find its corresponding message.
3. For any two messages, their hash values need not be the same.
In cryptography, hash functions are used to provide the integrity of a message (m). if the hash
value of m is stored in a secure place then the modification of m can be detected by calculating
the hash value and comparing it with the stored value. Hence, the hash functions are also known
as modification detection codes (MDCs) [23].
In addition, hash functions provide message authentication and it authenticate the origin
of the message. If hash functions are used in message authentication it is called as message
authentication code (MAC).
2.4.2 Digital signatures
The process of signing to impose the transformation of message and the secret key into a tag
is called as digital signature. The purpose of Digital signatures is to provide a reason to the
receiver to trust or identify the message which is sent by the known sender only.
Digital signatures uses the concept of public-key cryptosystem. Usually, digital signatures
depend on the secret key of the signer and can be generated only by the signer. In general, digital
signature consists of two algorithms they are [23]:
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1. Sign algorithm: It takes a message and a secret key as an input and generates the signa-
ture.
2. Verify algorithm: For the given message, public-key and signature, it verifies whether the
message is authentic or not.
Digital signatures are intended to provide both data integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation of the message.
Example: If Alice wants to sign a message (m), by using the Sign algorithm with secret key
(sk) and generates the signature as s = Sign(sk,m). When Bob receives the signature (s) for
the message m, he checks the signature is valid or not by applying the verify algorithm by using
Alice’s public key (pk) as V erify(pk, s,m) = valid.
From the above example, we can say that Bob can verify the Alice signature and the message.
It is possible only when Bob uses the correct Alice’s public key and the message.
On the other hand, there are possibilities that adversary can inject the message into the com-
munication channel and pretend as Alice or Bob. It is called as a forgery or possible type of
attacks (see section 2.7) on the transit information. In that case nobody can identify the forgery
of the message, even Bob too. To overcome these type of forgeries or attacks, digital signatures
uses cryptographic hash functions. Here, Alice first applies the hash function to the message to
get the hash value and than she encrypts the hash value using her private key. This encrypted
hash value is used as Alice signature and sends the digital signed message to the Bob. Now, Bob
knows the message and the digital signature. Now, Bob applies the hash function on the message
to get the hash value and decrypts the hash value using Alice public-key. Finally, Bob verifies
whether the two hash values are valid or not; if they are valid then Bob confirms that the digital
signature message is sent by Alice.
Thus, by using the hash functions in digital signatures the non-repudiation can be ensured. It
suggests that now Alice cannot state that the message is not signed by her.
2.5 Cryptographic protocols
A Cryptographic protocol can be defined as an algorithm with well defined sequence of steps
which must be followed by two or more communicating parties, to solve the issues involving
confidentiality, authenticity and data-integrity.
In modern cryptography, the development of well defined protocols lead us to provide high
level of security. Cryptographic protocols are developed based on cryptographic primitives such
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as hash functions, symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. Cryptographic protocols are called as
multi-party algorithms. Meaning, it must be communicated between at least two parties.
2.5.1 Key-exchange and entity authentication
The major draw back of symmetric-key cryptosystem is the key exchange or key agreement. This
issue becomes more evident especially when, used in a cluster of network systems where more
than two entities communicate. It is know that, in symmetric-key systems both Alice and bob
agrees on a secret key. To share the secret key securely symmetric-key system uses the concept
of public-key cryptosystems. The first solution available for the key exchange problem is the
Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [21] which is based on public-key cryptosystems.
The draw back of continuous key exchange using Diffie-Hellman key agreement is that, there
is no authentication between the communicating parties. Whereas, entity authentication ensures
the identity of the communicating parties there by avoiding impersonation. In entity authentica-
tion, Alice can prove her identity by signing her signature on the messages. There are possibil-
ities that adversary can intercepts Alice signed message and later on adversary can authenticate
as Alice. This type of attack is called as replay attack. One solution to prevent from replay attack
is to vary the Alice signature in [23] .
One of the methods used to prevent replay attack is the challenge-response protocol. This
protocol is based on public-key digital signature scheme. In challenge-response protocol, first
Bob sends any random number to Alice and she uses the same random number in the message and
signs it with her signature before sending back to Bob. Now Bob verifies the random number
which he has sent earlier to Alice and later on Bob validates her signature. Here, the random
number is viewed as a challenge. Other than this protocol, there are other protocols like two-way
and three-way authentication protocols [23]. These authentication protocols play a major role
in some of the technologies for instance in RFID technology, where the RFID reader and tag
must authenticate each other for communications. How cryptographic authentication protocols
are used in RFID will be discussed in chapter 6.
2.5.2 Identification
Identification is defined as a technique which provides the identities of both the entities to verify
each other which are involved in a communication.
One of the techniques used earlier is personal identification number (PIN) and password
method. If Alice wants to do electronic transactions with the bank, first she has to enter her PIN
and a password into the system to view her account details. But the passwords and PIN are not
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secure. Since there are chances that if anyone come to know her password or PIN during her
transaction, it might impersonate as Alice and extract all her banking details.
There are protocols designed to eradicate these type of issues. For example, fiat-shamir iden-
tification protocol, zero-knowledge [23]. Thus, cryptographic protocols play a major role in en-
suring the confidentiality, data integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. The key-agreement
generally should take place between two parties (sender and receiver) in the field of communi-
cation. The establishment of keying methods between the parties ensures the confidentiality of
secret keys so that, once the secret keys are agreed, any messages can be encrypted securely.
Once the keys are agreed, it also ensures the authenticity by using public or private key agree-
ment, this can be achieved using the concepts of digital signatures or hash functions. Now the
receiver can verify the senders identity and ensures the non-repudiation. By using public keying
methods one can provide the data-integrity, that is if the senders key is signed by any trusted
third party then the receiver can consider that key with confidence.
2.6 Pseudo-randomness
The concept of randomness is used for the better encryption purpose. Most of the encryption
algorithms prefer the random key selection so that, keys cannot be predicted by an adversary. In
general, pseudo-random sequence bits are generated by an algorithm known as pseudo-random
bit generators. The output of these generators is a long sequence of pseudo-random sequence
of bits for any given small random input which is known as the initial state. The basic building
blocks of pseudo-random generators are the Linear feedback shift register (LFSR) [24].
2.7 Attacks
The main objective of cryptography is to provide security for the transmitted message from the
adversary, who tries to extract the information from the transmitted message. Before designing
any cryptographic system one should assume that, the adversary knows everything about cryp-
tographic system implementation and the algorithms used. This principle is commonly stated as
the kerkhoff’s principle.
Adversaries try to extract information about the secret key so that, ciphertext can be broken to
recover the original message. Attacks by the adversaries can be classified into two types, passive
and active.
In passive type of attacks, the adversary observes only the communication channel and it is a
threat to the confidentiality of the data.
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In active type of attacks, the adversary can modify, delete or inject the data into the commu-
nication channel and it is threat to the data integrity, authenticity and confidentiality.
Attacks can be divided into following types based on the resources used by the adversary.
The objective of these types of attacks is to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext or to extract
the information about the secret key.
1. Ciphertext-only attack: In this type of attack the adversary has the knowledge of ciphertext
and tries to extract the plaintext or the decryption key from the known ciphertext. Any
encryption scheme is considered insecure if it cannot resist this type of attack.
2. Known-plaintext attack: Here the adversary uses knowledge of plaintext and its corre-
sponding ciphertext and tries to extract the secret key and recover the encrypted message.
3. Chosen-ciphertext attack: The adversary selects the ciphertext and tries to decrypt its
corresponding plaintext. Assuming that the attacker has access to the decryption system.
4. Chosen-plaintext attack: In this type of attack the adversary first chooses the plaintext and
obtain its ciphertext. After few analysis on how to obtain the plaintext from the unknown
ciphertext, the adversary tries to analyze the cryptographic pattern outputs that are being
used and try to recover the secret key.
5. Man-in-the-middle attack: Here the adversary gets access to the communication channel
used by the sender and receiver and tries to send some non-specific key exchange informa-
tions from the middle of communication.
6. Replay attack: The adversary retains the capability to store or record the communication
of the sender and receiver. Later on the adversary replays the same communication after
some point of time.
7. Relay attacks: It is similar to man-in-the-attack and replay attack. In this the adversary
relays the message from the sender and sends it to the receiver. Relay attacks are commonly
occur in wireless devices such as RFID devices.
8. Side-channel attacks: In side channel attacks, the attacker tries to get secret information of
the cryptographic systems which are implemented (physically) hardware.
(a) Timing analysis attacks: In timing attacks, the attacker tries to analyze the execution
time taken by the cipher for encryption or decryption operations. Basically, it is based
on measuring the time taken by a unit to perform its operation and the measuring
information can reveal the secret key.
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(b) Power analysis attacks: In this type of attacks, the attacker tries to get information





Finite Fields play a major role in some of the most interesting applications of modern algebra to
the real world. In particular, the applications related to the data communication is a vital concern
in our information friendly society. In today’s technological advancements in the areas of space
and satellite communications, protecting the privacy of information involve the use of finite fields
in one way or the another.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of concepts of field and group. Next, we will
explain the concepts and types of finite fields of the form GF(p), where p is a prime number.
Before going to the details of finite field extension of the form GF (pn), where n is a positive
integer, it needs to be discussed some of the elementary background in polynomial arithmetic
operations. Finally, we briefly discuss about the normal basis and types of optimal normal basis.
3.1.1 Modular Arithmetic
Modular arithmetic has gained importance in the area of cryptography. In Public Key Cryptosys-
tem algorithms such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman algorithm uses the theory of modular arithmetic
including, symmetric key algorithms such as AES, IDEA and RC4. The major advantage of
using modular arithmetic is that it allows us to do faster multiplication operations. For example,
in any complex operations such as polynomial greatest common divisor calculation where we
come across large number of integers to perform number of multiplication operations. The use
of modular arithmetic reduces the computing times of these large operations. In one of the ap-
plications like error correcting codes each digit of the code is related to the elements of the finite
field by using the modular arithmetic theory.
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Note that, the modular operator (mod n) maps all the integers within the confined set of
integers {0, 1, 2, ... (n− 1)} and all the arithmetic operations are performed within this set. This
techniques is called as modular arithmetic.
The set of integers and nonzero integers of mod n are denoted by Zn and Z∗n respectively.
Example 1: Modular addition and multiplication over modulo 23.
Suppose, 12 + 20 = (12 + 20) mod 23 = 32 mod 23 = 9
since the remainder is 9 when 32 is divided by 23.
Similarly, in multiplication operation; 8 × 9 = 72 mod 23 = 3, since the remainder is 3
when 72 is divided by 23.
3.2 Groups and Fields
Fields and groups are the well known algebraic structures of the abstract or modern algebra.
In abstract algebra, we work with sets on which elements can be operated algebraically. For
instance, we can say that by combining two elements of a set in several different ways the third
element of the set can be obtained. All these operations will follow certain specific rules which
will define the nature of the set. The notation followed for operations on set of elements is usually
same as the notation for ordinary addition and multiplication.
Groups :
Definition 1 A group (G) is defined as a pair (S, •), where S is set of elements with binary
operation •, such that, it obeys axioms from A1 - A4.
The binary operator • is generic and can be referred to addition, multiplication and other
mathematical operation.
Note: Here the set S is the representation of group G. From now on we represent group as
G.
Axioms Meaning
A1. Closure For all a, b in G, a • b will be in G
A2. Associative For all a, b, c in G, a • (b • c) = (a • b) • c.
A3. Identity There exists an element e in G, for all a in G, such that
a • e = e • a = a. More formally, ∃ e ∈ G ,
∀ a ∈ G, a • e = e • a = a
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Note: We denote identity element in G as i
A4. Inverse For every a in G, there exists an element x in G, such that
a • x = x • a = i. More formally,
∀ a ∈ G, ∃ x ∈ G, a • x = x • a = i
In order to satisfy the A4 axiom the operation must have an identity element.
Example 2: For any positive integer n (Zn, +) is a group.
The set Z5 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, where n = 5, with addition module 5 forms a group, for example
2 + 4 = 1 (mod 5).
Example 3: If p is prime then (Z*p, ×) is a group.
The set Z*5 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, where p = 5, with multiplication module 5 forms a group, for
example 2 × 4 = 3 (mod 5).
Note: If a group has finite number of elements then it is called as finite group, otherwise, it
is an infinite group. The order of the group is the number of elements in the group.
Definition 2 A group is called an abelian group if it satisfies the following axiom.
Axioms Meaning
A5. Commutativity For all a, b, in G, a • b = b • a
Definition 3 A group is called cyclic if there are one or more members that can be used to
generate all members by raising the generator to a power. More formally: ∃ g ∈ G, ∀ a ∈
G, ∃ k, a = gk
A cyclic group is always abelian.
Example 4: If p is prime then (Z*p,×) is a cyclic group.
The Cyclic group (Z*7, ×), where p = 7, the order of the finite group is 6. And the elements
3 and 5 are the generators of this cyclic group Z*7 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, then the powers of 3 module
7 are
1 = 36, 2 = 32, 3 = 31, 4 = 34, 5 = 35, 6 = 33
Fields :
Definition 4 A field F, is defined as a set of elements with two binary operations +, ×, which is
represented as (F, +, ×). Such that it obeys the following axioms.
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Axioms Meaning
(A1 - A5) F forms a abilian group with respect to addition
(A1 - A3) and A5 F with respect to multiplication satisfies the axioms.
Note: The additive and multiplicative identity elements in F is denoted by 0 and 1 respec-
tively.
A6. Multiplicative inverse For every a in F , except a = 0, there exists
an element x in F such that a× x = x× a = 1.
More formally, ∀ a 6= 0 ∈ F, ∃ x ∈ F ,
a× x = x× a = 1
Example 3: For any field (F, +, ×). (F, +) forms an abilian group.
Example 4: For any field (F, +, ×). (F *, ×) forms an abilian group, where F * is the
elements of F excluding additive identity element 0.
3.3 Finite Fields:
Finite fields play a major role in the area of cryptography. Most of the cryptographic algorithms
such as the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), the El Gamal public key encryption, elliptic curve
public key cryptography are heavily depend on the properties of finite fields and it is also used in
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptography.
The order of the finite field must be a power of prime pn, where n is a positive integer. Here
two cases exits; for n = 1, the finite field is of the form GF(p) where GF stands for Galois Field
and for n > 1, the finite field is of the form GF(pn). The finite field GF(p) has different structure
compared to the finite field GF(pn).
Types of Finite Fields:
(i) Prime field: It is defined as a field of the form GF(p) of order p, where p is prime. All the
elements in this field and arithmetic operations (+, ×) perform with respect to the modulo p.
(ii) Binary field: It is defined as a field of the form GF(pn) of order pn, where n is a positive
integer. Usually binary field is constructed using the prime field.
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3.3.1 Finite Field of the form GF(p) :
For any prime p, finite field of order p, the elements of GF(p) is defined as the set
{0, 1, 2, ...(p− 1)}, along with the arithmetic operations modulo p. GF(p) can also be denoted
by the set of integers Zp.
Example 4: The arithmetic operations in the simplest finite field of the form GF(p).
The simplest finite field is GF(2), where p = 2, and its elements are {0, 1}, this is a special
case where the arithmetic operations + and× is just equivalent to the XOR and AND operations
respectively.
The additive inverse elements for 0 and 1 is 0 and 1 respectively.
The multiplicative inverse elements for 0 and 1 is -(do not exist) and 1 respectively.
Example 5: The arithmetic operations in the finite field of the form GF(3).
The finite field of GF(3), where p = 3, and its elements are {0, 1, 2}, the arithmetic operations
+ and× is just as simple operations on integers followed by a reduction modulo p. For instance,
in GF(3), 2+2 = 4 which is reduced to 1 modulo 3. Similarly, 2× 2 = 4 reduced to 1 module 3.
The additive inverse elements for 0, 1 and 2 is 0, 2 and 1 respectively.
The multiplicative inverse elements for 0, 1 and 2 is -(do not exist), 1 and 2 respectively.
Note : Before going to the finite field of the form GF(pn), we need to discuss about the
concepts of polynomials. Since they are extensively used in finite fields GF(pn).
3.3.2 Polynomial Arithmetic:
The elements of GF(pn), when n > 1, can be represented as polynomials, whose cofficients
belong to GF(p) and degree should be less than n. When p is 2, the elements of GF(pn) is
represented as binary numbers {0, 1}. This means that each term in a polynomial expression is
represented by one bit in the corresponding binary expression.
We are interested in polynomials over fields. From now on the field will be denote as
(F, +, ×) as F .
Definition 5 A polynomial is defined as a mathematical expression involving sum of powers in
one or more variables multiplied by their cofficients (constants). A polynomial with one variable
and their constant cofficients is represented by
f(x) = anx
n + an−1x
n−1 + .....+ a2x






where, n (integer n ≥ 0) is called the degree of the polynomial, where the cofficients ai,
0 ≤ i ≤ n, are elements of F and x is the symbol which is not belonging to F referred to as
indeterminate (symbol which does not stand for anything). F is also called cofficient set, when
an 6= 0 and such polynomials are known to be defined over F . It is possible to have same powers










A. Addition of f(x) and g(x) is defined by:
f(x) + g(x) =
n∑
i=0
(ai + bi) x
i, for n = m























ai bk−i = a0bk + a1bk−1 + ...+ ak−1b1 + akb0.
Note that the degree of the product is the sum of the degrees of the two polynomials.
Example 6: Let f(x) = x3 + x2 + 1 and g(x) = x3 + x, calculate f(x)× g(x)
x3 × (x3 + x2 + 1) = x6 + x5 + x3
x× (x3 + x2 + 1) = x4 + x3 + x
= x6 + x5 + x4 + x
C. Division of m(x) and p(x) is defined by:
Polynomial division over Galois field can be computed using the rules of multiplication and
addition. The division of two polynomialsm(x)÷p(x) is defined asm(x) = q(x)×p(x)+r(x),
where quotient q(x) and reminder r(x) are results of the division operation.
Example 7: Let m(x) = x5 + x3 + x2 and p(x) = x3 + x, calculate m(x)÷ p(x).
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x2
x3 + x | x5 + 0x4 + x3 + x2 + 0x1 + 0x0
x5 + x3
x2
Therefore q(x) is x2 and r(x) is x2.
Verify the above results using the definition :
m(x) = q(x)× p(x) + r(x)
= (x2)× (x3 + x) + x2
= x5 + x3 + x2
Note: Polynomials over F are important in constructing the structure of linear feedback
shift register sequences (See Section 3.7).
3.3.3 Finite Field of the form GF(pn) :
In this section we are interested in constructing the finite field of the form GF(pn). In the previous
section we saw finite field of the form GF(p) of order p, where p is prime. The elements of GF(p)
= Zp = {0, 1, 2, ... (p− 1)}, under arithmetic operations (+,×) are performed with respect to
modulo p operation. We use the similar concept to construct the finite field of the form GF(pn),
containing q − 1 elements, where (q = pn) under the reduced module pn − 1 operation.
Fact: The set GF(pn) along with two arithmetic operations (+,×) forms a finite field and
the order of the field is pn.
Note: We denote non zero elements of GF(pn) as GF(pn)* .
Irreducible Polynomial over Field :
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Definition 6 A polynomial i(x) is known as an irreducible polynomial over a field F , if and
only if i(x) cannot be derived as a product of two or more polynomials over field F. With analogy
to integers, an irreducible polynomial is also called a prime polynomial.
Fact: For every prime p and for every degree n > 1, there exists at least one irreducible
polynomial of degree n over GF(p).
Example 8: Consider the irreducible polynomial i(x) = x3 + x+ 1 over the field GF (2).
The possible factors of i(x) with degree less than i(x) are x and x + 1. The product of
these two possibilities will not be equal to x3 + x + 1. Therefore, the given i(x) is irreducible
polynomial over GF (2).
Primitive Element and Primitive Polynomial :
Definition 7 A primitive element of GF(pn) is an element which is a generator of a cyclic group
GF(pn)*. An irreducible polynomial over GF(p) having zero as a primitive element in GF(pn) is
called a primitive polynomial over GF(p).
Note: Not all irreducible polynomials are primitive.
Root of Polynomial :
Definition 8 If p(x) is a polynomial over F , then the element α ∈ F such that p(α) = 0 is called
a root (or zero) of the polynomial p(x).
Subfield :
Definition 9 If a subset S whose elements are from field F which satisfies the field axioms along
with the arithmetic operations of F , then S is called a subfield of F .
GF(pm) is a subfield of GF(pn), if and only if m is a positive divisor of n, i.e., GF(pm) ⊂
GF(pn).
Example 9: GF(22) ⊂ GF(24) and GF (24) ⊂ GF(212)
Extension Field :
Definition 10 A field F is known as an extension field, if S is a subset lying under the set F
with respect to the field operations then by definition S is a subfield of F and F is an extension
field of S. Which is denoted by F/S and read as ” F over S ”.
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If F is an extension field of field L, which in turn an extension of K, then L is an interme-
diate field of the field extension F/S.
To construct (extension field) a finite field of the form (GF(pn), +, ×), of order pn, where n
is a positive integer, by selecting an irreducible polynomial as f(x) of degree n over GF(p). Let
α be a root of the f(x), which satisfies f(x) as f(α) = 0. Then GF(pn) is defined as [25]
GF(pn) = {a0 + a1 α + ....+ an−1 αn−1 | ai ∈ GF (p)}
Note: Here one should know that the addition operation is done by module GF(p) whereas,
the multiplication is done by modulo of irreducible polynomial.
Example 11: To construct a finite field of the form GF(23) with irreducible polynomial
f(x) = x3 + x+ 1 over the field GF(2).
Let α be a root of f(x), i.e. f(α) = 0. The finite field GF(23) is defined as {a0 + a1 α +
a2 α
2 | ai ∈ GF (2)}
All the elements of GF(23) can be derived from the given equation f(x) = f(α) =
α3 + α + 1 = 0, with respect to the modular 7 operation.
The elements of GF (23) are 0, 1, α, α2 and from α3 they can be derived as α3 = α + 1,
and α4 can be written as = (α3)(α) = (α+ 1)(α) = α2 + α. Similarly, we can derive rest of the
elements.
For the given irreducible polynomial of degree 3, table given below shows 3-tuple binary,







000 0 0 = α∞
100 1 1 = α0
010 α α
001 α2 α2
110 1 + α α3
011 α + α2 α4
111 1 + α + α2 α5
101 1 + α2 α6
α7 = 1
Here the elements of GF(23) are represented in polynomial notation (basis and is explained
in section 3.4) and exponential notation which represents the elements in GF(23). Also note that,
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GF(23)∗ i.e. the non zero elements of GF(23) form a cyclic group of order 7 with generator α,
where α7 = 1.
The polynomial f(x) and α is called the defining polynomial and defining element respec-
tively. We can say that GF(23) is the extension field of GF(2).
For instance, addition of two elements (1 + α+ α2) and (1 + α) is (1 + α+ α2) + (1 + α2)
= α.
For multiplication, it can be written in a simpler way as (1 + α + α2) = α5 and (1 + α2)
= α6. Therefore (1 + α + α2) (1 + α2) = α5α6 = α11 = α4 = α + α2
Trace Function :
Definition 11 Suppose, F = GF(pn) and K = GF(p), then the trace function TrF/K(x) is
defined by
Tr(x) = TrF/K(x) = x+ x







, x ∈ F
The trace function Tr(x) converts GF(pn)→ GF(p)
Example 11: For the finite field GF(23) which is defined by α3 + α+ 1. Compute Tr(α) and
Tr(α3).
From the trace function Tr(x), when p = 2 and n = 3, we can extract Tr(α) = α + α2 + α4
= α + α2 + α + α2 = 0, Similarly for
Tr(α3) = α3 + α6 + α5 = (1 + α) + (1 + α2) + (1 + α + α2) = 1
3.4 Basis
Basis can be defined based on the circumstances being used. For instance, an element in a finite
field can be represented in the form of a basis. Since, we are interested in finite fields where two
types of basis exists; polynomial basis and normal basis. Thus an element in a finite field can
be represented either in polynomial [26] [27] or normal basis [28] [29] [30].
Polynomial Basis :
Definition 12 Consider the finite field as GF (pn) and let α ∈ GF (pn) be the root of an ir-
reducible polynomial of degree n over GF(p). Then the Polynomial basis is represented as
{1, α, α2 ... αn−1} of GF (pn) over GF (p).
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Where α is called a primitive element of GF(pn).
Example 12: If p = 3 and n=2. then GF(32) is a simple extension field of of GF(3) of degree
2. Let α ∈GF(32), be a root of the irreducible polynomial x2+1 over GF(3), then the polynomial
basis is {1, α} of GF(32) over GF(3).
Normal Basis :
Definition 13 For any positive integer n in GF (pn), there will be always a normal basis for the
finite field GF(pn) over GF(p). If γ ∈ GF (pn) be a normal element, then the normal basis is
represented as {γ, γ21 , α22 ... γ2n−1}.[31].
where γ is called a generator or normal element of GF(pn) over GF(p). Which is is repre-
sented in the form of n×m matrix and denoted by M.
Example 13: If p = 2 and n=3. then GF(23) is a simple extension field of GF(2) of degree 3.
Let α ∈ GF(23), be a root of the irreducible polynomial x3 + x2 + 1 over GF(2), then the normal
basis is {α, α2, 1 + α + α2} of GF(23) over GF(2).
3.4.1 Selection of basis for hardware implementation:
In this section we briefly discuss about the selection of basis for the finite field arithmetic op-
erations especially for hardware implementation. We know that finite fields play a vital role
in cryptography and especially in symmetric and asymmetric key cryptosystems which involve
finite field arithmetic operations.
Usually arithmetic operations over GF(2n) are performed under reduced modulo of the ir-
reducible polynomial f(x) over GF(2). Arithmetic addition and subtraction operations are per-
formed under modulo 2. Addition of two polynomials is nothing but the bit-wise exclusive-or
(XOR) operation of their binary representation whereas multiplication operation is the complex
and time consuming over the field GF(2n). Complexity is based on the selection of irreducible
polynomial and the basis used to represent the finite field elements. Besides that there are past
publications [32] [33], where they talk about the efficient implementation of finite field arith-
metic.
Polynomial basis is considered for hardware optimizations, because in polynomial basis the
the multiplication operation can be implemented using simple shift and XOR operations [34].
In normal basis hardware implementation for squaring an element is simply a right cyclic shift
of its coordinates [31]. Therefore, squaring in normal basis is simple and cost effective. But,
multiplication in normal basis is more complex. Complex in terms of utilization of hardware
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resources such as number of logic gates, area and so on. To overcome this in normal basis, in
[35] they introduced the optimal normal basis.
Optimal normal basis holds an upper hand in efficient hardware resources utilization [28] [29],
such as number of logic gates, XOR and AND gates compared to normal basis. In section 5, we
have seen two types of optimal normal basis, type I and type II. Type I basis are efficient in
hardware implementation over GF(2n), but the drawback is that they are not suitable to some of
the cryptographic areas since n is even [31] whereas type II is suitable since n can be odd. Since
then number of researchers started to introduce efficient implementation of multipliers using type
II [31] [33] [28] [29].
3.5 LFSR and mathematical description:
Linear feedback shift register (LFSR) have been widely used in keystream generators in stream
ciphers, random number generators in most of the cryptographic algorithms. In this section we
discuss about LFSR definitions and their sequence representation. Each of the square blocks in
figure 3.1, is a 2 state (0 or 1) storage units. The n binary storage units are called as the stages
of the shift register and their contents are in the form of n bits in length, which is called as the
internal state of the shift register.
a







 , ..., x
n−1
 )
Figure 3.1: Block diagram of LFSR
Let (a0, a1, a2, ..., an−1) ∈ GF (2n) be the initial state of the LFSR and
f(x0, x1, x2, ..., xn−1) be the feedback function or feedback polynomial, as shown in figure 3.1.
If the feedback function is a linear function then it can be expressed as
f(x0, x1, x2, ..., xn−1) = c0x0 + c1x1 + c2x2 + ......+ cn−1xn−1, ci ∈ GF (2) (3.1)
After each consecutive clock pluses the LFSR will generate a output binary sequence b of the
form b = a0, a1, ...
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ci ak+i, k = 0, 1, ..... (3.2)
The output of the LFSR is considered as a linear recursive sequence. If the feedback function
is linear then the output sequence is called LFSR sequence. Otherwise it is called as the nonlinear
feedback shift register (NLFSR) sequence.
Notes : Let b is the binary sequence. In general the linear feedback function equation (3.2)
is represented in polynomial of the form f(x) = xn+ cn−1xn−1 + ...+ c1x+ c0, which is known
as the characteristic polynomial of the LFSR.
Example 1: Consider a 3-stage LFSR as shown in figure 3.2 with the linear feedback function
f(x0, x1, x2) = x0 + x1 with initial state as (1, 0, 0) equivalent to (a0, a1, a2). The output












Figure 3.2: 3-stage LFSR
3.5.1 Different types of sequences:
1. Binary Sequence: b = bi, bi ∈ GF (2) , is a binary sequence over GF(2).
2. M-Sequence: The output sequence generated by an n-stage LFSR with non zero initial
values and has maximal period 2n − 1 is know as the maximal length sequence or in short
called as m – sequence [25].
3. De-Bruijn sequence: De-Bruijn sequence is the output of an n-stage NLFSR having period
2n and satisfies the n-tuple occurrence exactly once in each period. From any m - sequence
with period as 2n − 1 we can obtain the de-Bruijin sequence by inserting a 0 into the run
of n – 1 consecutive zeros of the m - sequence [25].
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Example 2: Consider a 4-stage LFSR as shown in figure 3.3 with the characteristic polyno-
mial f(x) = x4 + x + 1 and with the initial state as (0, 0, 0, 1) equivalent to (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4).
The output is a m - sequence is 000100110101111000100..... which is repeated periodically with




Figure 3.3: 4-stage LFSR
3.5.2 Advantages of LFSR Properties:
Since LFSR’s are widely used in keystream generators. To consider LFSR based keystream
generators as cryptographically secure, the design of LFSR should have the following desirable
properties [21].
1. Large Period.
2. Large Linear complexity.
3. Good statistical properties.
Notes: If b is a binary sequence then the linear complexity of b is the shortest length of the
LFSR that generates b. It is denoted by LS(b). For any given b of length N, one can compute the
linear span of the sequence using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm.
3.5.3 Hardware implementation of LFSR over Galios fields:
In hardware implementation the LFSR contains N registers connected together to form a shift
register. Generally, shift register is a sequence of flip flops in which the output of the last flip flop
is connected (feedback) to the earlier flip flops by an XOR gate as shown in figure 4. Suppose
the length of the LFSR is N than it consists of N – stages of flip-flops and the stored bits are
controlled by a single clock. At each clock pulse, the bits in the storage elements is shifted by










Figure 3.4: 3-bit LFSR circuit
Some of the design parameters when designing LFSR are the number of flip flops, external or
internal XOR gates, feedback taps (inputs fed to the XOR) and reset signal. On reset the register
is set to all 1’s and for analysis purpose here we use LFSRs with internal XOR gates since their
circuitry are matched with the polynomials over the Galois fields.
The LFSR generates a maximum bit sequence of length 2n − 1 combinations, where n is the
size of the finite field. The feedback taps on the LSFR is selected based on the chosen polynomial
over the finite field. Polynomial arithmetic operations are carried out with respect to the mod 2
operations i.e. the coefficients of the polynomial must be either 1’s or 0’s. These polynomials
are called feedback or characteristic polynomials. The LFSR bit sequence can be represented by
the characteristic polynomial. If the bit sequence is 110011 then the characteristic polynomial is
denoted as x5 + x4 + x1 + 1.




















Figure 3.5: LFSR implementing characteristic polynomial
From the above example exponents of polynomial are represented as: x0 is the input to the
LFSR, x1 is the output of the first flip flop and x2 is the output of the second and so on. Moreover
the maximum exponent of the polynomial represents the number of flip flops used in the LFSR.
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other exponents denote the flip flops with or without tap connections to the feedback line from
the last flip flop.
3.5.4 Polynomial multiplication and division in LFSR:
Using the example 6 from section 3.3.2, the multiplication f(x)×g(x) = (x3+x2+1)×(x3+x)
circuit using LFSR is shown in figure below.
x3 + x
x3 + x2 + 1
(x3 + x) (x3 + x2 + 1) 
=   x (x3 + x2 + 1) 
x3 (x3 + x2 + 1)
+
=   x6 + x5 + x4 + x 
Figure 3.6: LFSR implementing multiplication
Similarly, by reusing the example 7, the division of m(x) = x5 + x3 + x2 and p(x) = x3 + x
can be implemented using LFSR is shown in the figure below.
x5 + x3 + x2
x3 + x
Figure 3.7: LFSR implementing division
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The input to the LFSR is 101100 which is the bit vector representation of m(x) and fed
sequentially in the higher order terms first into the LFSR circuit. At the end of clock cycle 6, the




The motivation of this chapter is to discuss about the WG stream cipher it was first proposed by
Guang Gong and Youssef [36]. The organization of this chapter is as follows, discussed about
the general stream cipher design in section 4.1. In section 4.2 classified different types of stream
ciphers. In section 4.3 discussed the design of stream ciphers based on LFSR. The design of
stream ciphers can be vulnerable to different types of attacks which have discussed in section 4.4.
Finally, in section 4.5, explained about the WG stream cipher, of its cryptographic properties and
discussed the parameter selections for WG in order to achieve an efficient cryptographic stream
cipher design.
4.1 Stream Ciphers
Stream cipher generates a cryptographically secure random sequence of bits known as keystream.
For cryptographic operations keystream is XORed with either the plaintext or ciphertext at the
bit level. The architecture of stream cipher consists of a shift register to store the secret key and
initialization vector in combination with the feedback function which updates with respect to
clock. The non linear filtering function is used to combine the m bits nonlinearly to generate a
single bit of keystream. The basic architecture of stream cipher is as shown in figure 4.1. Stream
cipher is also known as the state cipher because the process of encryption not only depends on




Non linear filtering 










Figure 4.1: Architecture of stream cipher
Stream and block ciphers comes under the family of symmetric key systems. Some of the
differences between them is that stream ciphers encrypt the plaintext message one bit at a time.
Whereas block ciphers encrypt the plaintext in large blocks of bits at a time. Stream ciphers
can execute faster, particularly in hardware, one of the reasons is that, operate on a single bit
or a byte at a time, and don’t have to store all the plaintext bits in buffer when compared to
block ciphers. Apart from that, stream ciphers are built using simple devices which are easy to
implement in hardware and execute efficiently, example Linear feedback shift registers (LFSR).
Due to these factors stream ciphers have less hardware complexity. Stream ciphers have no error
propagation because in stream ciphers during the transmission if a ciphertext bit is modified, then
the decryption of other ciphertext bits does not effect. On the other hand keystream generation
is independent to the encryption or decryption operation.
4.2 Classification of stream ciphers
Stream ciphers are classified into three types; One-time pad ciphers, synchronous stream ciphers
and self synchronous stream ciphers.
In one-time pad ciphers, the keystream bits are used only once and the That is different
keystream bits are generated for different plaintext messages. The disadvantage of one-time pad
ciphers is that, the keystream must be of same length as plaintext. There by making insecure in
practice [21].
The drawback of one-time pad ciphers motivates the design of stream ciphers whose keystream
is pseudo-randomly generated from a smaller secret key [21]. In general, stream ciphers generate
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their keystream based on their internal state. If the keystream is generated independently to the
plaintext and ciphertext then it is called synchronous stream cipher where as, if the keystream
generated based on some previous ciphertext bits then it is self-synchronous stream cipher.
In synchronous stream ciphers the keystream is generated independently to the plaintext and
ciphertext messages. Later on keystream is combined with the plaintext for encryption or with
ciphertext for decryption operations. During communication both sender and receiver must be
synchronized by using the same key and the same internal state. Sometimes synchronization
might fail due to insertion or deletion of some of the ciphertext bits which further fails decryption.
To restore synchronization again the process of re-synchronization is used [21]. Synchronous
stream ciphers have better advantages in hardware applications because of less resources like
limited gate count or low power consumption. Synchronous stream cipher is also know as addi-
tive stream cipher.
One of the drawback of additive stream cipher are, they uses the same secret key, resulting
the same keystream generation always. From the security point of view re-use of same secret
key is not a good idea.
To overcome this problem, the concept of initialization vector (IV) is used usually, stream
ciphers IV is combined with the secret key. Initialization vector is a random block of bits which
changes with every instance of the cipher. It is used to introduce randomness to the output of the
cipher. This makes the output of the stream cipher unique and random compared to the outputs
produced by the same key.
In self synchronous stream ciphers or asynchronous stream ciphers, the keystream is gener-
ated based on the secret key and also on the previously generated ciphertext bits.
4.3 Stream Ciphers based on LFSRs
We have already discussed about the concepts of LFSR in chapter 3. The rationale behind use of
LFSRs in stream cipher design is to achieve few of the properties such as long period, large linear
complexity and statistical properties. These properties play a major role in cryptography. Most
of the stream cipher designs are constructed based on LFSRs are well suited in implementing
in hardware and also are easy to analyze mathematically. Since LFSRs are the basic building
blocks of stream cipher it is important to note that the output sequence of the LFSR does not
inherit the property of linearity. If the stream ciphers exhibit the linearity property then its output
would be vulnerable to known or chosen-plaintext attacks (see chapter 2). To avoid these linearity
properties of the LFSR, there are three methodologies proposed to increase the security of stream
ciphers based on LFSR’s [21], they are
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1. Nonlinear combination generators
2. Nonlinear filter generators
3. Clock-controlled generators
4.4 Classification of stream cipher attacks
This section briefly discusses different types of attacks on stream ciphers. Generally, cryptanalyst
analyzes the keystream generator of the stream cipher. Thus most of the stream ciphers based on
LFSRs are vulnerable to different types of attacks. These are as follows
1. Exhaustive key search: It is a common type of attack applicable to any stream cipher. For
a given keystream, the attacker tries all the possibilities of keys, generates the keystream
and compares them with the given keystream to find out the actual secret key.
2. Periodic attacks: The period (length) of the keystream must be large. If the period is small
then it enables easy prediction.
3. Correlation attacks: Its a general type of attack applicable to all stream ciphers based on
LFSR. In this type of attack, the attacker can correlate the keystream with the output of a
similar device such as LFSR. This leads to extraction of the secret key.
4. Algebraic attacks: Stream ciphers are based on the system of mathematical structure usu-
ally, algebraic equations. By solving the algebraic equations one can recover the secret
key.
Note: The linear complexity (see Chapter 3) of a binary sequence is length of the shortest
LFSR which can generate that sequence. Linear complexity can be easily measured by using
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [21]. The attacker can produce the same binary sequence of the
LFSR if the linear complexity is too small.
In order to be secure against these type of attacks, stream ciphers based on LFSR designs must
posses a good cryptographic properties. How to achieve cryptographic properties by selecting
various parameters is discussed in the next section by explaining a concrete example of a stream
cipher called WG stream cipher.
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4.5 Welch-Gong (WG) Stream Cipher:
WG cipher is an example of LFSR based stream cipher. In this section we briefly describe the
WG cipher, its cryptographic properties. The parameter selections to ensure better cryptographic
properties and for efficient hardware implementation are also explained.
4.5.1 Introduction:
For small and efficient hardware implementations, most of the hardware based stream ciphers use
Linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) and Boolean functions with compact Algebraic Normal
Forms (ANF) [6] as their basic building blocks. Following the discovery of algebraic attacks
on the Boolean functions with compact ANFs there are no longer secure. To overcome these
algebraic attacks, non linear feedback shift registers (NLFSR) are used, Which basically updates
the internal state of the stream cipher nonlinearly.
Usually in stream cipher design the complexity comes while analyzing the design. Most of
the stream cipher designers invest more time in analyzing the design itself. Moreover LFSR
based stream ciphers have well defined theoretical results for the purpose of analyzing compared
to NLFSR based designs. WG cipher is designed such a way that its design is easy to analyze.
Which allow the designers to evaluate or prove various security properties of the design.
The drawback of LFSR based stream cipher designs; they are vulnerable to algebraic attacks.
To overcome these algebraic attacks, WG is designed based on nonlinear Boolean functions
with large number of inputs and high degree [6]. In order to avoid complexity of hardware
implementation, Boolean functions are designed using the polynomial form instead of ANFs.
Since, the polynomial forms can be implemented using small finite field multipliers.
WG cipher consists of a keystream generator which generates long pseudo-random binary
sequence called keystream. The basic idea here is to keep the WG keystream as random as
possible. So, that encryption and decryption operations will be cryptographically more secure.
Therefore, to ensure randomness properties WG keystream generator uses transformations called
as WG transformations. Which acts like a nonlinear filter function [6] discussed in section 5.3.
WG transformation can be implemented in polynomial form using the finite field arithmetic.
and generates a sequence called WG transformation sequence. The existence of several cryp-
tographic properties for the WG transformation sequence, which makes WG cipher suitable for
cryptographic applications are already known [6].
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4.5.2 Mathematical description of WG :
WG cipher considered as a nonlinear filtering function. The basic building block of WG keystream
generator consists of a l stage linear feedback shift register followed by a WG transformation as
shown in figure 4.2. To achieve few the cryptographic properties, the selection of LFSR is based
on the selection of primitive polynomial (see chapter 2) of degree l over the finite field GF (2m)
which is of the form p(x) = xl + xl−1 + ... + x + β, where β ∈ GF (2m) . The primitive
polynomial acts as a feedback polynomial for the l stage LFSR.
The LFSR generates a maximal length WG transformation sequence known as m-sequence
(see Chapter 2) over the fieldGF (2m) This in turn filters the output of the LFSR by the nonlinear
WG transformation. Using the trace function denoted by Tr(x) (see Chapter 2) the sequence is
converted into binary keystream (bi). In figure 4.2 the feedback signal “initial” is used only once
during the initialization phase. Only the feedback which is in the LFSR keeps running when the
cipher is operating. The output of the cipher would be 1 bit at a time.
WG design generates the binary keystream of period 2n − 1, where n = ml, m is the bit















Figure 4.2: WG Keystream generator
Note: The feedback polynomial of the LFSR and the parameters of WG transformation
should be selected properly to achieve better cryptographic properties and for efficient cipher
design.
4.5.3 WG transformation
In this section, the formal definition of WG transformation is discussed [36]. WG transformation
f(x) is defined mathematically as
f(x) = Tr (g(x+ 1) + 1), where x ∈ GF (2m) (4.1)
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, x ∈ GF (2m) (4.2)
The function g(x) exists only when m(mod3) 6= 0 [36], where g(x) = x + xq1 + xq2 +
xq3 + xq4 , x ∈ GF (2m), where qi is defined as follows [36] [6].




2k−1 + 2k−1 + 1,
q3 = 2








2k−2 + 2k−1 + 1,
q3 = 2
2k−2 − 2k−1 + 1,
q4 = 2
2k−1 − 2k−1 + 1.
(4.4)
If α is a primitive element (see Chapter 2) of GF (2m), then the WG transformation se-
quence b can be derived as b = bi , as shown in figure 4.2 and where bi = f(αi) = Tr (g(αi +
1) + 1), i = 0, 1, 2, 3 ...
Apart from that from equation (1) we can say that the WG transformation involves compu-
tations such as multiplications over the finite field GF (2m). Whereas, elements of the finite field
can be represented either in polynomial, normal, or in optimal normal basis and the selection of
these basis are discussed in section 5.5.1
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4.5.4 Properties of WG :
WG transformation sequence has widely investigated in the area of sequence design and found
the existence of various properties both on randomness and cryptographic. Since the security of
any cryptosystem relies heavily on randomness or unpredictability, various cryptographic prop-
erties related to the WG sequence b, [36] .
Some of the Cryptographic properties are :
1. Long period of 2n − 1.
2. Balance property.
3. Ideal 2 – level autocorrelation.
4. n-tuple distribution .
5. The linear complexity of WG sequence increases exponentially with n.
6. 1 – order resilient.
WG sequence is proved for all the above mentioned properties, therefore it is well suited
for the cryptography applications. Since, WG transformation involves various parameters such as
finite field width m, length of the LFSR l, selection of basis for representing finite field elements
and selection of primitive polynomial or feedback polynomial. Therefore it is worth to discuss
about the selection of these parameters. in order to achieve hardware efficiency and cryptographic
properties which is discussed in next section.
4.5.5 Selection of parameters for WG hardware implementation
For the purpose of our research we will concentrate only on smaller finite fields for example
GF (24) or GF (25), because our focus is to design an efficient WG cipher for an RFID applica-
tions. and RFID needs less hardware resource utilization, low power and speed.
1. WG transformation exists only if m( mod 3) 6= 0 [36]. The value of m is selected in such
a way that m(mod3) = 2, because the value of m results in smaller values of k and which
in turn reduces the number of multiplications (section 5.3).
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2. For the smaller values of m i.e. m ≤ 11, table based design can be used for storing all
the GF (2m) values. Later on the table based design can be implemented either in random
logic or in ROM. Here optimal normal basis (ONB) can be used and exists only for values
m ≥ 11 [6].
3. WG cipher can be implemented either in normal or polynomial basis, and the selected
basis must be at least 1-order resilient.
4. The complexity of computing WG transformation involves in multiplication operations
over GF (2m). And the hardware implementation relies on choosing the basis which is
used to represent the field elements.
5. If the WG transformation is implemented using normal basis of the form x2i , in hardware
it is achieved by shifting of bits of the element x by cyclically to right by i position which
computes x2i [37]. And optimal normal basis multipliers are used because they are smaller
than other multipliers.
6. If the WG transformation is implemented using the Galois field multipliers, then the ONB
is preferable. Since, ONB multipliers are smaller and occupies less area and low cost. But
ONB does not exist for every m.
7. If the WG transformation is implemented using the random logic or a ROM then the poly-
nomial basis is preferable. This allows the implementation of multiplications in the LFSR
by wired shifts and with less XOR gates [24]. The utilization of hardware resources de-
pends on the selection of basis and in turn it correlates with the clock speed [24].
8. After selection of basis, the LFSR feedback polynomial p(x) (which must be a primitive
polynomial) and a generating polynomial g(x) is selected. g(x) is generally used to gen-
erate all the elements of GF (2m) and the basis are used to represent these elements. The
primitive polynomial is of the form of p(x) = xl + xl−1 + ... + x + β. To implement,
β polynomial basis is preferred because of less hardware utilization compared to normal
basis.
Note: If a polynomial basis is used then β is of the form αk, where α is a root of g(x) and
values of k in equation 2 varies such that multiplication by αk can be implemented using
wired shifts and few XOR gates. Where as if we use normal basis then multiplication by
β needs to be a constant which uses more area.
9. The degree of the primitive polynomial p(x) must be large, so that, the LFSR generates
a longer period and to achieve this the size of the internal state (LFSR in bits) should be
twice as the secret key.
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10. The size of the internal state must be twice as the secret key, in order to prevent from the
time/memory/data trade off attacks. While the algebraic degree of the primitive polynomial
must be high, to prevent from the algebraic attacks [6].
11. To ensure the large linear complexity of the keystream, parameters such as n and m must
be selected such that the linear complexity is higher. Where m is the finite field bit width
and n is the size of the internal state (LFSR in bits). Linear complexity can be increased
by increasing the number of stages in LFSR and vice versa [6].
12. The keystream generated by the WG keystream generator ensures the property of periodic
two-level auto correlation property [6].
Note: To achieve this property, the feedback polynomial of the LFSR over the finite field
GF (2m) and the WG transformation should use the same basis in the WG keystream gen-
erator.
13. We are interested in smaller finite fields (m ≤ 11), table based design is used for computing
all the elements of GF (2m) and in turn table based design can be implemented using
random logic as well as to achieve higher clock speed. On the other hand, polynomial
basis is used to represent the field elements.
14. To avoid the slowing down of the clock speed of the cipher which occurs because of the
multipliers in the LFSR feedback which dominant the critical path. The number of multi-
plications ( i.e. efficient implementation of β ) and number of taps on the feedback LFSR
can be reduced as much as possible.
From the above discussion it is evident that, the design parameters such as, the feedback
polynomial of the LFSR, the number of bits m used for the WG transformation, and the basis




Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
The motivation of the chapter is to understand the RFID technology. In section 5.1 we briefly
discuss various reasons why RFID has been the successor of optical bar code system. Section 5.2,
explains the components involved in the RFID system and different types of RFID tags and their
characteristics. Section 5.3 describes the important concepts such as inductive coupling which is
involved during the communication between the tag and the reader. RFID system functionalities,
frequency bands and requirements are developed by the standard organization bodies such as
ISO and IEC, where as the format of RFID tags data is developed by the EPC global. Different
standards and classes of EPC are described in section 5.4. Section 5.5 explains the security and
the role of cryptographic solutions to overcome the security concerns in RFID systems. We also
explained various hardware metrics and their constraint requirements for passive type RFID tags.
Finally, section 5.6 and 5.7 describe some of the RFID privacy goals and definitions and explain
different type of attacks on RFID systems respectively.
5.1 RFID technology
RFID technology has become an integral part of our daily life. RFID is considered as a wireless
automatic identification and data capture (AIDC) technology [2]. Any remote object or person
that has an RFID device attached can be identified automatically. The communication in RFID
system generally takes place between the three components, RFID tag or transponders, RFID
reader or transceivers and back-end database system (computer). RFID tags are classified into
three types; passive, active and semi-passive tags which can operate on different frequency bands;
Low frequency (LF), high frequency (HF), ultra high frequency and microwave frequency. For
our research purpose we are interested in passive tags which communicate with the reader and
operate on high frequency.
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On the other hand, optical bar codes were used on consumer objects for identifying over
twenty years. Universal Product Code (UPC) or bar code is one of the widely used optical
barcodes, designed in 1974 [38]. RFID technology stands as a successor before UPC bar code
technology for past several years. Definitely RFID tags has benefits over barcodes. Some of the
advantages of RFID tags over barcodes are:
1. RFID tag do not have to be in line of sight for operation or without any precise position
whereas, optical bar code require line of sight.
2. RFID readers can read (scan) hundreds of tags per second whereas, optical bar code has to
be read manually one at a time.
3. RFID tags store their identification number, store specific application data, execute and
respond the data information for any particular queries from the reader.
4. Since RFID tags are silicon based various functionalities can be implemented like inte-
grated sensors, read/write storage, capable of supporting cryptographic encryption systems
and access control [39].
RFID stands as “the first important technology of the 21st century” [40]. Due to the
technological advancements in the semiconductor manufacturing, researchers are shrinking the
size of RFID tags. In recent years, Hitachi came up with the worlds smallest new RFID chips
called Hitachi µ-type chip which is just 0.4 × 0.4 millimeters and it uses uses ROM for storing
a unique 128 bit identification number [41]. Due to cutting edge technologies the cost of RFID
tags has drastically dropped and the size of tag varies depending on applications. The cost of
RFID tags at present can go up to U.S. $1.50 for smaller quantities, it is expected that this cost
would drastically fall in the future years to $0.10 cents or less [42]. Where as RFID readers can
cost several thousand dollars each at present, since they are in demand too, it is likely that their
cost will soon drop significantly [42].
The caliber of RFID devices basically depends on how well the RFID standard definitions
are implemented. Some of the standardization bodies like International Organization for Stan-
dardization (ISO) and International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) play a crucial role in
regulating the use of RFID. We will discuss briefly about different standards of RFID in the
section 6.5.
The broadening of RFID standards diminishing cost of RFID further, many well known
large organizations like Wal-Mart and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) gave a good start
in deploying RFID tags by using them for their suppliers. RFID technology anticipate to play a
vital role in many different applications in the near future. Now a days RFID is used in hundreds,
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if not thousands of applications [43] like proximity cards for access control into the buildings,
supply chain tracking, airports, tracking books in libraries, traffic management, monitoring the
patients in hospitals and preventing theft of automobiles.
RFID system
In general, RFID device is called an RFID tag. RFID tag is a tiny silicon chip which is
designed for contact less (or wireless) data communications using radio frequency (RF) waves.
The silicon chip stores the unique identification information of the object or human and transmits
the identity in the form of unique serial number (ID) known as Electronic Product Code (EPC) to
the RFID reader which in turn communicates with the back end database system. RFID devices
are also known as EPC tags.
Example of RFID system: In a hospital over 300 patients can be tagged with the RFID
tags. Now the doctors and nurses would be able to identify the patients name, gender and age
with their RFID reader. With this information now the hospital staff can retrieve the patients file
from the back end database system.
5.2 Components of RFID system
RFID system consists of mainly three components and the interaction between these components




Figure 5.1: RFID System
1. Tags: RFID tags are also called as transponders it consists of a tiny integrated circuit (IC)
which is integrated with a small non-volatile memory used for storing the identification
number (ID) of an object (e.g., the laptop) and with an antenna connected to it. The antenna
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permits the tag to couple with the electromagnetic (EM) field which is generated by the
reader antenna to obtain the power or to communicate with the reader or to do both. The
tag sends the ID to the reader under request. Tags can also be called RFID labels which
are attached to the objects. Transponders have wide range of functionalities implemented
in them like read/write memories, encryption algorithms, sensors and access control.
2. Readers: RFID readers are also called interrogators or transceivers. These are capable of
generating electromagnetic (EM) field for transmitting and receiving the responses from
the tag. RFID readers can scan hundreds of tags per second. At the same time, reading
distance might be hundreds of meters which depends on the type of tag being used, fre-
quency bands, reader power limitations and interference by other systems [45]. Generally,
RFID readers are placed in a fixed locations to communicate with the tags and also with
back end database systems. Readers will be in charge for queries to the tags.
3. Backend database systems: Since tags have small memory space, and it cannot store all
the information related to the tagged objects. Back end database system is used for storing
the rest of the tagged object informations. For verification purpose the RFID readers will
check the database to identify a tagged object and to obtain further information.
Moreover, that memories in RFID tags can be either read-only or read-write accesses. In
fact, nowdays the standard one are read-write memory tags. Read-only tags are programmed by
the manufactures with their ID number and they cannot be altered. Whereas, read-write memory
tags are divided into two parts for the user purpose, first part is for secure read-only in which
user can write the unique ID number and the second part is for any free rewritable data [46].
5.2.1 Types of tags
RFID tags can be classified into three types; passive, semi-passive and active tags based on their
power source.
Passive tags: These tags are small in size with no batteries and less expensive. Thus the
main source of power in these tags is from the signals coming from the RFID reader. Passive
tags cannot operate in the absence of RFID reader.
Semi-passive tags: Tags do have batteries, but they require an external source to activate
them by means of interrogated signals from the reader.
Active tags: Tags have batteries to power up their circuitry for transmissions. Active tags
can initiate a communication [44] and can operate even in the absence of RFID reader. Active
tags are expensive.
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Passive and active tags are widely used in most of the RFID systems and also in many
industries. Semi-passive tags are the combination of both passive and active tags characteristics.
Selection of tags are mainly based on their frequency, range, memory, and other characteristics.
Some of the major characteristics of active and passive tags are tabulated below in the table 6.1
based on [47].
Characteristics Passive tags Active tags
Strength of signal re-
quired
very high very low
Availability of power only in the pres-
ence of reader
anytime
Read range upto 3− 5 meters
or even less
upto 100 meters






Data-storage 128 bytes in read-
write memory
[3]
upto 128 kb in read-
write memory [3]
Life time upto 20 years upto 5 - 10 years
Table 5.1: characteristics of passive and active tags
5.3 Inductive coupling communication
In this section we discuss some of the concepts used during the communication between the
passive type tag and the reader.
Passive tags receive their power to enable their integrated circuits from the RFID readers
via electromagnetic field. It uses the concept of inductive coupling or far field (defined as the
area from the antenna to the point where the electromagnetic field forms) for communicating
the data with the readers. Inductive coupling is used only for the frequencies of 13.56 MHz
and below [48]. The concept behind inductive coupling is that, the reader’s antenna generates
electromagnetic field and induces it in the form of current into the tag’s coupling elements such
as coiled antenna and a capacitor. The current induced in the coupling element is used to charge
the on-tag capacitor, which provides the operating voltage and the power to the tag circuitry.
Inductive coupling works only in the near field communications (near field is defined as the area
after the point at which electromagnetic wave is fully formed and separated from the antenna).
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5.4 RFID Standards and frequency bands
Since RFID systems are accepted by many different applications, RFID should provide some
functionalities other than just basic object identifier [49]. These functionalities should be devel-
oped on a proper standardized system. Major organizations like ISO and EPC global which play
a crucial role in developing RFID standards for different frequencies and applications.
5.4.1 Standards
Till today, many RFID standards have already been in use and many are being proposed. Stan-
dards mainly observe how the tag and the reader communicate to each other, how the data con-
tent is edited or organized and know whether the applications are following the standards, for
instance, in companies while shipping their RFID labels. ISO collaboratively works with the In-
ternational Electro-technical Commission (IEC) they deal with the general type of standards cov-
ering with the problems related to the air interface, data-content, conformance and performance
[1]. ISO standards are mainly towards the technology side not particularly into application-
oriented [1]. Some of the ISO standards and their respective applications are explained below:
ISO 18000 is a multi part standard specifies protocols for LF, HF and UHF frequency
bands. Whereas, in HF tags ISO 14443 and 15693 standards are used for applications such
as proximity cards and vicinity cards respectively. In addition to these standards ISO 18000-3
standards are used for item management, air interference communications [5] [3] [1] [50].
5.4.2 EPC structure and classes
EPC global was developed from the other organization called the Global Standard 1 or GS 1 and
it deals with barcode standardization. EPC global developed the EPC, which is most widely used
and recognized. EPC has a unique code for identification of objects or items which is similar
to the bar code numbering system i.e. UPC (Universal Product Code). Like the bar codes, EPC
contains information about the manufacturer the product details and the most crucial part is the
unique serial number, which is not shared by any other item or object on this earth. The current
form of the EPC code is shown below in figure.5.2
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Electronic Product Code
01     .  0000A89   . 00016F   . 000169DC0
Header 8-bits EPC Manager 28-bits Object Class 24-bits Serial Number 36-bits 
Figure 5.2: EPC structure
There are different EPC structure exists but for our research purpose we are interested only
in 96 bits [51]. The EPC code present on the tag generally is a 96 bit length and used for
encoding and reading the data from the 96 bit RFID tags. As shown in figure 5.2, 96 bit identifier
structure is divided into four partitions which are explained below:
• Header (8-bits): Defines which version of EPC is being used and also defines the num-
ber, type and length of all subsequent data partitions. This 8 bits provide 256 possible
partitioning schemes [52]. First scheme is EPC type I, proposed for object identification
number.
• EPC Manager (28-bits): Defines about the manufacturer or entity and responsible for track-
ing and maintaining the object class type codes and serial numbers in their domain [52].
Thus, 28 bit provide maximum of 228 million possible manufacturers [52].
• Object class (24-bits): This is equivalent to the product number. Additionally considered
as a tracking mechanism for particular groups like stock keeping unit (SKU) or can be used
for lot number.
• Serial number (36-bits): The final partition encodes the unique object identification num-
ber. For all similar object types, EPC serial number provides 236 unique identifiers.
EPC global has classified RFID tags into five classes (1–5) in order to improve their design,
develop different capabilities and usage. The classification has become well popular in manu-
facturing and supply chain applications due to its specifications. Higher the class levels, higher
the functionalities and more sophisticated capabilities. The classification of RFID tag classes are
defined as follows:
• Class 0 or 1: Simple passive identity tags with minimum functionalities like read-only
memory.
• Class 2: Passive tags with higher functionalities like tag identity, read - write memory, with
enhanced security features [45].
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• Class 3: Semi-passive tags enhanced with additional built in power source such as battery
which enables the tag even in absence of RFID reader. Therefore, tags can provide better
read range compared to the class 1 and 2 tags.
• Class 4: Active tags with an in built battery to operate the tag by itself. It has same
functionalities as class 3 tags. In addition, they can communicate with other class 5 tags
using both active and passive communication [49].
• Class 5: RFID readers which encompass the functionality of class 4 active tags and in
addition has capabilities to power up and communicate with pure passive class 1, class 2
and class 3 tags using passive communication.
Due to wide area of applications and demands, EPC global is developing the functionalities
and standards in the same classes, for example, Class 1 is an updated version of class 0, which
has capability to work on both frequencies UHF and HF. The new version of Class 1 Generation
has better features like larger memory size, user memory option and kill command option, which
allows the tag to permanent defunction [1].
5.4.3 Frequency bands and characteristics
In order to utilize the RFID communication without any interference with other radio service,
RFID frequencies are divided into different frequency bands. In general, frequency bands which
are used by cell phones, broadcast, astronomy etc, are called primary user bands. In addition to
these bands, there are different bands which are used for industrial, scientific and medical (ISM)
purposes. RFID system is allowed to operate on ISM bands mostly [53] and these are 125/134
KHz (LF), 13.56 MHz (HF), 830-930 MHz (UHF), 2.45 GHz (MW), [3] [1].
Different types of RFID tags uses different frequency bands and are selected on the basis of
application requirement. The operating range of the RFID tags mainly depends on its frequency
used. Some of the characteristics and applications of RFID is shown below in table 5.2.
5.5 RFID security by hardware design
RFID technology is widely used in many applications but the major concern in RFID technology
is security and privacy. Since, the communication between the tag and the reader takes place via
wireless, i.e. the information exchanged between them is over an insecure channel. Generally,
insecure communication channels are vulnerable to different types of attacks. Therefore, security
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Table 5.2: RFID tag frequency bands and characteristics (Based on [1])
by a person or an object. To overcome these concerns in RFID tags, one of the solution is
to implement cryptographic solutions in RFID tags. Recent publications have surveyed more
elaborately about the security and privacy issues in RFID systems [54] [55].
5.5.1 Role of cryptography
In chapter 2 we have seen various cryptographic primitives such as symmetric-key, asymmetric
key and hash functions. Cryptographic primitives are built in RFID systems to achieve some of
the security objectives which are described below:
Confidentiality normally, the data is communicated between the RFID tag and the reader
over the insecure communication channel. To keep the data confidential or secret from the at-
tackers, the data is encrypted using a secret key in the RFID system. It is important to protect the
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data either from tag-to-reader or reader-to-tag because of various factors [11]. Confidentiality
can be achieved either by using symmetric or asymmetric systems.
Authentication is another important objective of cryptography. Here the objective is to
prove their identities either by the RFID tag or the reader during their communication. There
exists number of cryptographic protocols for the purpose of authentication, one of the commonly
used protocol is challenge-response protocol. Authentication protocols can be either single-side
or mutual authentication. In single-side authentication only the reader or tag will authenticate
their identities whereas in mutual authentication both the tag and the reader should prove their
identities to each other. In RFID system, authentication plays a major role in terms of security
feature such as preventing cloning of tag and unauthorized access to the tags [11]. Data authen-
tication can be achieved by MACs (message authentication codes) in symmetric-key systems.
Data integrity Provides security from the data manipulation threats between the tag and
the reader. Usually, data manipulation can be found by comparing it with the transmitted data.
In cryptography, hash functions are used to provide integrity of the data which ensures from
man-in-the-middle attack.
Non-repudiation is not important for RFID applications [11].
In general, the role of cryptographic objectives required for constrained devices like RFID
system depends on the type of application. For low-cost RFID applications the level of security
requirement is moderate because the amount of data required for encryption and decryption is
limited [13]. Therefore the role of cryptography in RFID tags depend on factors such as physical
space required for the implementation, cost of the tag and power consumption. In next sections
we discussed the various factors required while designing a cryptosystem for a low cost RFID
tag.
5.5.2 Lightweight cryptography
Since, both security and privacy issues in RFID systems needs to be addressed by means of cryp-
tographic solutions. It is a challenging task mainly because of strong constraint environment
for computing and communication resources, which leads to higher cost. Due to these factors,
the design of cryptographic solutions in RFID systems is not an easy task. Therefore, the de-
sign of efficient cryptographic algorithms and protocols has been proposed which is known as
lightweight cryptography.
To take into account, the strong stringent requirements in RFID tags such as area, power
and cost, the design of dedicated lightweight symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems must
be within the range of RFID constraint limitations. The advantage of symmetric-key over the
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asymmetric system is that, it has limited mathematical computations. Which allows the hard-
ware design of symmetric-key systems efficient in terms of area and power to implement them
on any hardware platforms. Most of the recent publications have proposed efficient lightweight
cryptography based on block ciphers [18] [56] [57] and stream ciphers [58] [59]. Recent stud-
ies suggest that stream ciphers require fewest computational resources in terms of area, power
and performance compared to block ciphers and hash functions [60]. Whereas, asymmetric or
public-key systems involve complex arithmetic operations over higher finite fields. These oper-
ations involve hundreds of bits thus need large amount of memory size to store them. Due to
this, the design utilizes more silicon area and power compared to symmetric systems. Some of
these factors makes them more cost expensive in terms of hardware implementations. Therefore,
public-key systems are not preferred to use in RFID systems in past couple of years [11].
5.5.3 Factors for good constraint implementation
In this section we briefly discuss some of the factors needs to be considered while designing a
hardware cryptographic stream cipher for a specific application like RFID. Here, we are inter-
ested in passive type RFID tags which require highly efficient cryptographic ciphers, in terms of
hardware resource utilization and low power.
Since, design of passive RFID tags need stringent requirements in terms of less silicon area
and limited power budget, the design of stream cipher must be constrained with these factors.
Technically, the silicon area and the power affects the cost of RFID tags. Thus if the design of the
cipher utilizes less silicon area then it is possible that, the design may utilize limited power. The
power available for passive RFID tags are limited because, passive RFID tags requires power to
enable its circuit operation via air interface [11]. Therefore cryptographic circuitry must consume
limited power.
In addition to above requirements security is one of the important factor that needs to be
considered while designing the cipher for RFID tags. One of the examples of passive RFID tags
where security plays a major role is the supply chain management where the products are trans-
fered from one place to another using the concept of EPC. Here, each product has its own unique
code or EPC for each passive RFID tag. The ability to track or identify these products raises the
security and privacy concerns, in other words the data transmitted or exchanged between the tag
and the reader can be monitored or read by some unauthorized persons. Therefore, building up a
cryptographic cipher functionalities is a good solution to overcome these security concerns.
Besides above mentioned factors, the design of cryptographic cipher must have a good data
transmission rate when it is used in RFID applications.
In the later sections of this chapter, we will discuss some of the important measurements
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that needs to be calculated while designing a hardware circuitry for a RFID tag. Few of the
optimization techniques commonly used to achieve limited silicon area and power under specific
Complimentary metallic oxide semiconductor (CMOS) technologies are also discussed.
5.5.4 RFID optimality metrics
This section discuss about the cryptographic hardware circuitry design metrics measured for the
purpose of RFID tags. By measuring the following metrics, specifies us how efficient the design
is in terms of various performances. These metrics can be measured during any digital design
flow (for example; ASIC flow) with the help of simulation tools. The results of the metrics can
justify whether the design is suitable for an RFID application or not. CMOS technology is used
for the design of cryptographic circuitry.
Area: Area can be defined as the amount of space utilized by the digital core design
over the silicon, i.e. the design excluding the power resources and the input-output (I/O) ports.
Usually, area is denoted as µm2 but it can also be measured in terms of Gate Equivalence (GE).
The measure of GEs gives a technology independent measure of area. It can be measured by
dividing the total area of the design with the lowest power two-input nand gate’s area. Further,
the pre and the post place-and-route analysis are carried out in ASIC design flow. In pre-place-
and-route analysis, the area is measured before the place-and-route and the measure is based
on just the area of the cells, or possibly with an estimation of area of wires. Whereas, in post-
place-and-route analysis the area is measured after routing wires between the cells. In recent
technologies, the area of wires can be a limiting factor in the area of circuit. The latter analysis
is more accurate than the pre-place-and-route analysis.
Maximum clock frequency: It is defined as the design at which the highest rate of the input
clock is required for its operations. It is measured by calculating the critical path (longest timing
path in the design) and setting the upper bound of the clock frequency.
Bits per cycle: It is defined as the number of output bits generated per clock cycle from
a cryptographic design. For example, it is measurement of the number of output keystream bits
per clock cycle from a stream cipher design. In other words, it can be measured as the number of
output bits from all subsequent blocks of keystream divided by the number of clock cycles per
block. It is also called output rate of the design.
Throughput: It is defined as the rate at which the circuit generate its output with respect
to time. Throughput is measured by multiplying bits per cycle with the clock frequency. It is
expressed in terms of bits-per-second. Maximum throughput attain at the time of maximum clock
frequency.
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Latency: It is a performance measure like throughput, which measures the time to compute
one cryptographic encryption operation (including the total time taken during the initialization,
loading key and IV). Usually, it is measured (units in milliseconds or microseconds) between the
start of the encryption operation and its completion.
Power consumption: It is a measurement to calculate the power consumed by a cryp-
tographic CMOS circuit. The total power consumption by a CMOS circuit is the sum of two
factors; static and dynamic power consumptions which are discussed in detail in section 5.5.5.2.
Energy per bit: It is measured as the total power consumed divided by the throughput.
Here, both (power and throughput) are measured at the same clock frequency.
Area-time product: Its a product of the time taken by the design to generate new output
each time and the total design area. Whereas, its reciprocal will give the throughput-to-area ratio
which is used for measuring the design efficiency .
Power-area-time product: It is measured as a product of area-time product and the power
consumption.
Power-time product: It is a product of time and the power consumed. This measurement is
useful in RFID applications, where both power and time play a major role during communication
between RFID reader and tag.
5.5.5 RFID design considerations and process
The following discussion would be on considering various factors while designing a crypto-
graphic cipher for a passive type RFID tags. Designing a cryptographic cipher using CMOS
technology for an RFID tag is a challenging task because of its various stringent requirements
such as, the CMOS silicon area, power consumption and the number of clock cycles required for
a single encryption operation.
5.5.5.1 CMOS technology and silicon area limitations
The CMOS technology is generally used for designing and fabricating any digital integrated
circuitry. Among various CMOS technologies known till date the most commonly used CMOS
technology is 130–250 nm for the production of high frequency (HF) RFID tags. But most
recently fabricated RFID tags were based on 180 and 130 nm CMOS process technologies [11].
The other newer technologies like 90, 60 and 45 nm were not used for RFID tags yet because of
their drawbacks. They are not featured with the non-volatile memories like EEPROM or flash to
store the unique identity or EPC on the tags [11]. The RFID readers supply voltage in the form
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of electro magnetic field to the tags to enable their circuitry which might exceed there voltage
limits in the newer technologies.
There are millions of RFID tags available in the market therefore, the challenge is to design
and fabricate a cost effective passive RFID tag. This is possible, only if the CMOS silicon area
is very less that is, the total size of RFID tag must be less including the cryptographic cipher
in it. The size of RFID tags increases as the cryptographic functionalities increases. In other
words, we can say that the size of the RFID tag depends on the complexity of the cryptographic
functionalities and the area of cryptographic cipher is directly proportional to cost of RFID tag.
By using the advanced CMOS technologies the size of a single GE will be smaller which makes
the silicon area lower. Besides that, the cryptographic circuitry which contains 1000 GE can be
implemented on a RFID tag without any additional cost of production [11]. Whereas symmetric
cryptographic cipher can be designed upto 5000 GE [11]. If the symmetric cryptographic cipher
uses advanced CMOS technologies such as 180 nm or less then the size of the cryptographic
circuitry would be comparatively smaller compared to RFID tag of sizes 0.1− 0.25 mm2 [11].
5.5.5.2 Power and energy limitations
In CMOS technology the total power consumed by the circuit is the sum of static and dynamic
power consumption. Static power consumption is caused by the leakage current of each tran-
sistor gate in the circuit and therefore it is proportional to circuit size. In most of the designs,
static power is often small and ignored based on the selection of CMOS process technology (for
advanced CMOS technology static power increases with the increase in subthreshold leakage
current which increases due to decrease in threshold voltage) [61]. However, the major concern
is the dynamic power consumption which occurs due to the switching of gate output from 1 to 0
and vice versa. Additionally, dynamic power consumption is proportional to the clock frequency
of the circuit and the switching activity of gates because it concentrates around clock edges [11].
To minimize the power consumption of any CMOS design, it needs to minimize the factors in
equation given below.
Pdynamic = CL .V 2DD .fclk .psw (5.1)
Where CL is the load capacitance of the circuit design, fclk is the effective clock frequency,
VDD is the supply voltage and psw is the switching activity of the gates in the circuitry. We will
discuss in detail various methods to reduce the power consumption later in section 5.5.6.
Power consumed by the cryptographic circuitry in passive tags is also an important factor
to look into. While implementing cryptographic circuitry on an RFID tag it should not limit
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the operating range of the RFID tag. Because, the power available for the RFID tag from the
RFID reader is very less, if more power is utilized by the cryptographic circuitry itself then the
remaining power would be insufficient which may affects the tags operating range. Generally,
in digital circuits power consumption can be measured indirectly by measuring the average cur-
rent Iavg because Iavg can be calculated directly from simulators. In RFID passive tags, the
power received from the readers is denoted as average power which is proportional to the aver-
age current; Pavg = Iavg.V dd, and V dd = 1.5v is constant [11]. Therefore, the average power
consumption by the cryptographic circuitry in passive tags must be low. Usually, in RFID tags
the average power consumption is calculated in terms of µA. The upper bound for the average
current consumption in RFID tags available is 15µA (in 350nm), beyond this limit the operating
range would be decreased [12]. It has been shown previously that the passive tags power must
be in range of 5 to 10 µA [10].
On the other hand, the energy consumption by the cryptographic circuitry depends on
the average power Pavg along with the duration t of the cryptographic computation i.e E =
Pavg · t. But, energy efficiency plays an important role only for the devices which are powered
by batteries. In passive tags average power is transmitted via electromagnetic waves from the
reader. Thus, energy consumption in passive tags does not play an important role unless there is
long enough time for cryptographic computation [11].
Most of the digital circuits designed for RFID tags have clock frequency 100kHz [62] [11].
The average current depends approximately linearly on the clock frequency and the supply volt-
age [12]. Therefore, during computation of the cryptographic circuitry power consumption per
clock cycle must be equal i.e, no clock cycle must consume excessive power.
5.5.5.3 Throughput and latency requirements
In RFID systems, throughput and latency are also important parameters to consider. Usually, in
RFID systems the data transmission rate is low ranges from 6 Kbps to 106 Kbps [11]. In terms
of cryptographic hardware throughput which are clocked at 100KHz must be able to compute an
encryption in 2500 clock cycles in the slowest case and 40 clock cycles in the fastest case [11].
Latency measures the time to compute one encryption it means that the number of clock
cycles required for computation one cryptographic encryption. The total time taken to complete
the cryptographic computation might also influence the response time of the tag. This can happen
in stream ciphers, especially during initialization phase where frequent key updates are needed,
depending on protocol being used that might lead to long latency [12]. For example, in RFID HF
tags the response time is 300 µs [12] [11].
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5.5.6 Low Power Design techniques
Due to low power budget requirements in RFID systems, the design of cryptographic primitive
must ensure low power utilization. In this section, we discuss some of the low power design
techniques which have been used widely in recent years [12] [11] [63] [64].
To minimize the dynamic power consumption (Pdynamic) mentioned in equation (5.1) it is
clear that, CL increases as the size of the chip increases and size of the chip increases due to
more number of gates present in it. The power consumption can be reduced by minimizing the
chip size and suppling the minimum supply voltage VDD.
The switching activity psw can be minimized by using the method called sleep logic [12].
By using this method, unnecessary switching activity can be ignored and it is implemented by
inserting AND gates at the input of the combinational logic. Thus, if there is better supply voltage
and the minimum switching activity then the better choice to reduce the power consumption is
by minimizing the effective clock frequency fclk of the circuit. Effective clock frequency can be
minimized by using the concept of clock gating [12]. Clock gating is used to switch off some
of the logic blocks in the circuit when they are not in use. Previous study [11] suggests that by
using clock gating concept to datapath registers and also to some of the control logic registers can
minimize power consumption significantly. In other words these registers are used only when
there is a potential signal change. In addition, gated clock can be used in the memory cells in a
design to minimize the unwanted switching activities [65].
In passive RFID systems, the energy consumption E = Pavg · t and duration of the
computation is of minor priority as explained in section 5.3.2. One of the effective approach for
lowering the average power Pavg is to increase the computation with respect to time. Thus, by
stretching out the same computation can lower the Pavg. Since, most of the RFID circuits are
not clocked higher than 100 KHz another approach is to serialize the computation by stretching
it out over more number of clock cycles. Both approaches are based on increasing the time t, it is
defined as t = Nc ·Ct, where Nc is number of clock cycles and Ct is the cycle time Ct = 1/fclk,
i.e. Ct is reciprocal of clock frequency fclk [11].
5.6 RFID privacy goals and definitions
Privacy is also an important concern in RFID systems. Tags start responding automatically and
start transmitting their information if any unauthorized readers are in the reading range. There-
fore, an attacker can easily read the tags confidential information from a long distance without
the knowledge of the person who is carrying the tags. Hence protecting the tags data is important.
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Information privacy In a ideal situation the backend database system or server is assumed
to be secure and reader communicates with server over secure channel. Only a legitimate reader
can query the server to look up tag keys.
Strong privacy A system is said to have strong privacy if the adversary cannot distinguish
between the outputs of any given tag. But an adversary is capable of obtaining the tags output at
a given time and break the privacy [66]
Forward untraceable It means that, if an adversary is able to access the internal state of the
tag at time T, the adversary cannot determine whether the tag has involved in a transaction after
certain amount of time T+α (for α > 0), provided only when adversary has not continuously
eavesdropping the tag after time T [67].
Backward untraceable If an adversary is able to deduce the internal state of the tag at time
T, the adversary cannot tell whether the tag is involved in a transaction before time T [67].
Challenge response A tag can reply with information only if, it receives the legitimate
challenge from the reader. The paradox here is that, a reader cannot know which challenge has
to transmit to a tag unless it knows the tag’s identity.
Random nonce To further strengthen the challenge-response mode, it is encouraged to use
the random nonce. This makes sure that every exchange is a unique. Thus, an adversary ob-
serving the tag and the reader will have a growing set of challenge and responses. To make the
security symmetric, it is important for both parties to use random nonce for mutual authentica-
tion.
Key update The tag should update its secret key after every successful authentication. This
will further strengthen the strong privacy of the system. Most protocols exchange new keys.
Based on the current secret shared by both parties, the keys should be updated. Moreover, the
new keys should still maintain the correctness of the system.
Once a tag has been successfully authenticated by the system, its stored key/secret will be
freshly randomized so that any kind of tracing can be prevented.
5.7 Types of attacks on RFID tags
Denial-of-service: Tags which are specially designed by the unauthorized persons (attackers) to
create a confusion to the interrogator from identifying the individual tags.
Spoofing: It is a kind of technique in which a attacker duplicates the tags data and transmits
it to the reader.
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Counterfeiting or Cloning: It can be defined as duplicating of one tags data to another tag
and later on the duplicated tag is used for communicating with the reader.
Data tampering: In data tampering the attacker tries to erase the data on the tag and make
it useless for communication or even he tries to modify the tags data.
Clandestine tracking: Generally RFID tags emit their unique serial number in respond to
the readers query. The readers can scan the tags when they are in readable range. Clandestine
scanning is a possible threat because, the tag starts responding without even informing to the
reader. Therefore, people who are carrying the objects with tags attached can be tracked with
there unique numbers even though if the tag does not contain any personal information. The
problem of privacy increases when the unique number is combined with the personal information.
Clandestine Inventorying: Clandestine inventorying occurs in EPC tags which contain the
information about the manufacturer of the object, object code etc. So, any person carrying reader
can say about what the other person is carrying and even try to get the personal information.
5.8 summary
Passive type RFID tags operate on high frequency (HF) bands (13.56 MHz) and supports the
RFID standards ISO 14443/15693 protocols. The major applications of this type of tags are
contactless smart cards, animal identification and so on.
The design of stream cipher must ensure some of the cryptographic objectives in-order to
provide efficient and secure communication between the RFID tag and the reader. In HF RFID
systems the data transmission rate is around 6 Kbps and 106 Kbps. Due to various stringent
requirements for RFID tags, the design of cipher must contain less than 5000 GE. CMOS tech-
nologies like 130 and 180 nm can be used for fabricating the RFID tag and for the production
of high frequency tags 130-250 nm are used. For a passive type tags the power consumption
must be in the range 5 to 10 µA. Where as the upper bound of average current consumption of a




In this chapter we discuss the implementation of WG-5 stream cipher. Section 6.1 describes the
structure of WG-5 keystream generator, and Section 6.2 and 6.3 explain the various mathematical
properties and the security analysis of WG-5 respectively. In Section 6.4, we describe the detailed
architecture of WG-5 and in section 6.5, we measure the area and performace of WG-5 in 65 nm
and 130 nm. In Section 6.6 RFID mutual authentication protocol based on WG-5 is proposed
and its security and privacy analysis is discussed. Finally, in section 6.7 we compare the WG-5
implementation results with other stream and block ciphers.
6.1 WG-5 keystream generator
WG-5 keystream generator consists of 32 stages of LFSR and the elements of LFSR are over
the field GF (25) as shown in figure 6.1. The output of LFSR is connected to a nonlinear WG-5
transformation function (WG5trans). The feedback polynomial of the LFSR is primitive over the
field GF (25) and is represented as p(x) = x32 + x23 + x13 + β, where β is root of the generating























Figure 6.1: WG-5 Keystream generator
The nonlinear WG-5 transformation, GF (25)→ GF (2), is applied to the output of LFSR
to generate the keystream. The WG-5 transformation is calculated according to the definition
discussed in section 4.5.3. Therefore, f(x) = Tr(t(x)), where t(x) = h(x + 1) + 1 and
h(x) = x + x5 + x7, x ∈ GF (25). After ignoring the common coset leaders and common
terms, we get f(x) = Tr(x7), x ∈ GF (25). If we consider the decimation of 11 for WG-5
transformation, then it is defined as WG5trans(x) = f(x11) = f(x15) = Tr(x15) x ∈ GF (25).
WG-5 keystream generator consists of key/IV initialization and keystream generation steps.
During initialization step the cipher is initialized by loading the key and initial vector bits into
the LFSR. It runs for 32 clock cycles with the initial feedback signal (init fb) from WG-5 trans-
formation. Each stage of the LFSR is denoted as Si, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 31. More precisely, let
S0, S1, ..., S31 ∈ GF (25) be the internal states of WG-5, then the output of LFSR is denoted by
bi = Si, where i = 0, 1, ..., 31. The nonlinear recursive relation of bi can be represented as
bi = bi−14 + bi−24 + βbi−32.
After key is initialized, the initial feedback signal (init fb) is disconnected from LFSR to
produce the keystream bits. To generate keystream bits, the contents of LFSR first stage S31 is
given to WG5trans which gives outputs of 1-bit after each clock cycle. More precisely, at each
clock cycle the contents of LFSR is shifted right and the updated value of stage S31 is fed to the
WG5trans to generate the running keystream bits (key strm). Thus, the running keystream bits
is bitwise XORed with the plaintext to generate the ciphertext.
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6.2 Cryptographic properties of WG-5
The keystream generated by WG-5 has period of 2160 − 1 and it possess balanced property.
It is proven that the boolean functions used in construction of WG transformation has 1-order
resiliency property [36] which can be immune to correlation attacks. In addition, it is also
proven that the WG transformation has an orthogonal transformation [36] thus, when WG5trans
is combined with the output of LFSR the resultant sequence is the ideal two level autocorrelation
sequence. The keystream generated by WG-5 generator is a GMW sequence. The internal state
of LFSR in WG-5 is 160 bits in length which is twice the size of the secret key. WG-5 has
acceptable linear complexity to consider it as a lightweight cryptosystem. Given, WG5trans
(x)= Tr(x7), x ∈ F25 , the linear complexity can be computed as LC = n ×
∑
i∈I
lw(i) = 5 ×∑
i∈I
32w(i) ≈ 217.32 where, index set I = {7} and l is the number of internal states of the LFSR.
If we consider the decimation of 11 then the LC can be increased to LC ≈ 222.32 with index set
I = {15}. But the 11-decimation does not provide 1-order resiliency property.
6.3 Security analysis of WG-5
Security level is an important parameter that needs to be considered while designing the stream
cipher. In this section, we present the extensive security analysis of WG-5 cipher based on the
measured linear complexity values given in the previous section. Our results demonstrate that,
in order to attack WG-5 cipher an adversary requires 217. 32 or 222.32 consecutive keystream bits.
Here we show that, WG-5 cipher is secure against various attacks such as algebraic, correlation,
cube, differential, discrete Fourier Transform and time-memory-data trade-off.
A. Algebraic attacks: It is shown previously that the stream ciphers based on LFSR are poten-
tially vulnerable to algebraic attacks [68]. We calculated the algebraic immunity of WG-5(x)
as 3 and according to [68], the time and data complexity of algebraic attack that recovers









≈ 219.35 respectively which suggests that WG-5 is resistance to algebraic attacks.
One more type of algebraic attack is the fast algebraic attack in which the adversary needs
even more keystream bits than the previous algebraic attack [69].
B. Correlation attacks: This attack on synchronous stream ciphers are based on the correlation
between the keystream bits and the LFSR output bits. To analyze correlation attacks on WG-5
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cipher, the nonlinearity and resiliency property needs to be considered. We calculated the non
linearity of WG-5 transformation as 12 based on [36]. The output of WG-5 transformation
or keystream bits in WG-5 has 1-order resiliency property, which means that the keystream
bits are not correlated to any single bit of the LFSR output. This explains that correlation
attacks on WG-5 is not feasible.
Fast correlation attack [70] is a type of correlation attack in which the decoding problem
can be efficiently solved by Maximum Likelihood (ML) decoding algorithm to retrieve the
internal state of LFSR. The complexity of this attack on WG-5 cipher was estimated on the
basis of the theoretical bounds given in [70]. Let h be a linear function such that hamming
weight of h(x) XOR WG5(x) is minimum. Then, the probability of producing the same output
for a given input x is P [WG5(x) = h(x)] = 2
5−NWG5
25
= 0.625. For the successful attack,
the amount of keystream required on the basis of results given in [70] and with parameter
t = 3 is N ≈ 1/4 · (k · 12 · ln2)1/3 · ε−2 · 2 l−k3 and the decoding complexity is given by
Cdec = 2
k · k · 2ln2
2ε6
, where l = 160 is the size of the internal state of the LFSR in bits,
ε = P [WG5(x) = h(x)]− 0.5 = 0.125 and k is the number of internal state bits recovered.
For lower (k = 3) and higher (k = 80) values of k, the amount of keystream required is
approximately 257.85 (not achievable) and 235.73 respectively and the decoding complexity
is approximately 298.76, which surpass the complexity of exhaustive key search. The above
analysis suggests that the WG-5 is secure against fast correlation attack.
On the other side, if WG-5 transformation is consider by 11-decimation then, the keystream
generated by it does not provide 1-order resiliency property. But the above calculation results
show that the required keystream bits N and the decoding complexity Cdec of correlation
attacks required to attack WG-5 are much higher and infeasible to achieve. Therefore we can
say that using 11-decimation function WG-5 is secure against fast correlation attacks.
C. Cube attack: It was first proposed in [71] and it is based on the degree of the polynomials
used for the design of stream ciphers. Since, in WG-5 stream cipher, the degree increases very
fast after 2l clock cycles (l is the length of the LFSR). Thus, after 64 clock cycles the degree
is high and to successfully to launch the cube attack the degree should be low. Therefore, we
suggest that cube attack is not possible on WG-5.
D. Differential attack: Study of differential cryptanalysis in [72] is that, any differences at the
input (key or the plaintext) side will lead to a predicted difference at the output (keystream),
which can help to analyze the internal state of the stream cipher. Differential cryptanalysis is
applicable only when the cipher has linear behavior. In WG-5, during the key/IV initialization
step the LFSR runs for 64 clock cycles and the output of LFSR is filtered by a nonlinear WG
transformation. For 32 ≤ i ≥ 95, the output of the LFSR is bi = WG(bi−1) + (bi−14) +
(bi−24) + βbi−32, if any bit change at the input side of LFSR, then after 32 clock cycles S31
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will be affected which will lead to subsequent change in the internal state of the LFSR. Single
bit of the LFSR will influence any cell in the LFSR internal state. Therefore, differential
attacks are infeasible in WG 5 due to its nonlinear transformations.
E. Discrete Fourier Transform attack (DFT):
In general, the idea of DFT attack is that the adversary tries to recover the internal state
of the stream cipher by using DFT sequences. Initially in [73], the authors proposed an
efficient algorithm to recover the internal state of the cipher without using the DFT sequence
in specific scenarios. For any keystream generator with m-sequence of period 2n − 1 based
on its boolean function , the complexity of attack is O (D) after observing D keystream
bits. While its pre-computation complexity is O(D(log2D)3). Furthermore, in [74] they
extended this attack to the finite field GF (2m) with similar complexity values. For WG-5,
the adversary requires to achieve 217. 32 keystream bits with a complexity of O (217.32) and
pre-computation complexity of O (223 . 44). Additionally, with increased linear complexity of
WG-5 the complexity of this attack would be O (222.32) and pre-computation complexity of
O (235 . 76) which is impossible to achieve. This suggests that DFT attacks are infeasible in
WG-5.
F. Time-Memory-Data Trade-off attack: The attack was discussed in [75]. The adversary im-
plements this attack in two phases. In the first phase the adversary analyses the design archi-
tecture of the stream cipher and stores the analysis results in the form of hard disks or tables.
In the second phase the adversary collects the stream cipher data (keystream) for an unknown
key. Now, by knowing the size of the tables as well as data and time required, the adversary
tries to recover the internal state of the stream cipher. In WG-5 the internal state is 160 bits
which is twice the size of the secret key and the complexity of this attack is O (280) which is
impractical to attain. This showed that, the WG-5 is secure against time-memory-data trade
off attacks.
6.4 WG-5 in hardware
In this section, we discuss detailed architecture of WG-5 as shown in figure 6.2. The hardware
implementation of WG-5 consists of datapath and control circuitry. Further, the datapath im-
plementation consists of WG-5 transformation and the control circuitry implementation consists
of FSM and LFSR. The FSM is used to generate the control signals for changing the WG-5 ci-
pher configuration that is loading key into the registers, initialization phase and run or keystream
generation phase. Note that, in addition to 32-stages of LFSR, we divided WG-5 transformation
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block into two; WG-5 core and trace function because during initialization phase WG-core signal



















Figure 6.2: Architecture of WG-5
6.4.1 WG-5 Core and trace function
In this section, we discuss the implementation of datapath circuitry; WG-5 core and trace func-
tion. It is a combinational circuitry which consists of AND gates, XOR gates and bitwise shifting
(re-wiring). The important building components in WG-5 core are, multiplier and squaring.
As we have already discussed in chapter 4, the elements of WG-5 transformation can be
represented either in polynomial or normal basis. We used normal basis representation for im-
plementing WG-5 core. Based on normal basis, different multiplier architectures exists as we
have discussed in literature survey in section 3.4. For the purpose of WG-5 implementation, we
used bit parallel normal basis multiplier architecture which utilizes 40 XOR gates and 25 AND








Figure 6.3: WG-5 Normal basis circuit
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The design goal of WG-5 core block is to generate the term x7 which we calculated accord-
ing to WG5trans definition explained in section 6.1. The architecture of WG-5 core in normal
basis is shown in figure 6.3. So to generate x7 we used squaring and multiplication operations
and it requires two squaring and 2 multiplication operations.
Thus, we completed the datapath implementation by connecting the output of WG-5 core
signal (init fb) which is 5-bits to the trace function and also fed the same signal to the LFSR
input. The trace function implementation is a sequence of XOR gates which adds all 5 bits and
outputs 1-bit. Current section focused only on datapath implementation of WG-5 cipher. In the
next section we explain the control circuitry implementation details.
init load WG-5 phase input at register S31
0 0 keystream generation lfsr fb
0 1 loading registers 5-bit input
1 1 loading registers 5-bit input
1 0 initialization lfsr fb ⊕ init fb
Table 6.1: Configuration of WG-5 based on init and load signals
6.4.2 Linear feedback shift register
In this section, we discuss the design of control circuitry of WG-5. First, we introduce the
























Figure 6.4: WG-5 LFSR
We implemented 32-stages of LFSR in WG-5 as shown in figure 6.4. In addition, we
introduced two sets of multiplexers at the input side of the LFSR. The multiplexers are used to
change the configuration of the LFSR with the help of two control signals init and load. The
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configuration of two control signals are shown in table 6.1. The β element at the feedback of the
LFSR is a constant element which is multiplied to the output of LFSR stage S0 and later XORed
with the taps as shown in figure 6.4. Thus, the total number of inputs to the LFSR are five; they
are clock (clk), 5-bit input for loading the registers, two control signals init, load to change the
configuration of LFSR and the initial feedback signal (init fb) coming from the WG-5 core.
Based on values of init and load control signals at the input side of LFSR, the phase of WG-5
cipher is executed.
Furthermore, for loading key and initial vector bits into registers from S31 to S0, serial or
parallel based design can be adopted. In WG-5, we used serial based design for loading all 32
stages of LFSR because, it utilizes 5 multiplexers at the input side of LFSR and it loads every
clock cycle. So in total it takes 32 clock cycles to fully complete loading. Whereas, parallel
based loading requires 160 (5 bits × 32 LFSR stages) multiplexers, because each stage requires
5 multiplexers and it takes one clock cycle to load all 32 stages. Since, loading phase occurs
only once at the beginning of WG-5 cipher operation, the utilization of 32 clock cycles by serial
based loading can be an acceptable trade off.
Load phase
01 10 
Initial phase Run phase
00
 rst = '1'







 rst = '1'
 cnt = 32  cnt = 32
Figure 6.5: WG-5 Finite State Machine Implementation
6.4.3 Finite state machine (FSM)
By designing the finite state machine we completed the design of control circuitry. The purpose
of FSM is to generate two control signals init and load for the LFSR which changes the config-
uration of WG-5 cipher. It consists of 3-states and its transition diagram is shown in figure 6.5.
The FSM design contains a counter to count the number of clock cycles being used at each phase
of WG-5 cipher and encoded the 3-states (LOAD PHASE, INITIAL PHASE and RUN PHASE)
with 2-bit vector, where, the left bit indicates the init signal and right bit indicates the load signal
as shown in table 6.1.
When reset signal rst is set to 1, FSM starts its operation as shown in figure 6.5. When
rst is 1 the state machine enters the state LOAD PHASE and the counter signal cnt resets to 0.
As shown in table 6.1, during this phase the init is 0 and load is 1, which loads the first 5-bits
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into the stage S31 of LFSR. Moreover, in LOAD PHASE, the cnt starts incrementing by 1 at
every clock cycle and when it reaches the value 32 the state machine makes transition to next
state INITIAL PHASE because loading the bits into all 32-stages of LFSR registers takes 0 to
31 clock cycles.
Once, the state machine reads INITIAL PHASE state the init and load values as 1 and 0
respectively as shown in table 6.1. During this phase, the input to the first stage S31 of LFSR is the
addition of LFSR feedback signal lfsr fd and the WG-5 core initial feedback signal init fb. In
this phase, the counter counts 32 clock cycles and after 32 clock cycles, the state machine makes
transition to next state RUN PHASE.
In RUN PHASE state the init and load values are 0 and the state is called as keystream
generation. During this phase the input to first stage S31 of LFSR will be the LFSR feedback
signal lfsr fd. In this state, the counter becomes idle and the finite state machine stay in this
state until the reset signal rst is set to 1. Moreover, the keystream is generated during this
state and other states LOAD PHASE and INITIAL PHASE are used for key initialization of the
WG-5 cipher. Note that in FSM, if rst is set to 1 then the state machine makes transition to
LOAD PHASE irrespective of the current state and the counter resets to value 0.
6.5 Area and performances results
This section summarizes the implementation results of WG-5 cipher over the field GF (25). The
length of cryptographic secret key and initial vector (IV) are 80-bits. The implementation of
WG-5 cipher was carried out using CMOS 65 nm and 130 nm technologies.
The results of area, performance and power tabulated in table 6.2 which were obtained for
ST microelectronics 65 nm and 130 nm cell library using Synopsys Design Compiler for logic
synthesis. The results obtained are after the place and route. The area is calculate in terms of
gate equivalents (GE), in 65 nm one GE is equivalent to a 2-input NAND gate value of 1.5600
µm2 whereas in 130 nm one GE is 9.9792 µm2. The power is measured in terms of Milli Watts
(mW) with respect to the clock frequency of 1 GHz. The performance is calculated as speed ×
bits over clock cycles. Optimality is ratio of throughput to Area×power.
65 nm 130 nm
Area Power Perf Opt Area Power Perf Opt
(GE) (mW ) (GE) (mW )
WG-5 1493 1.76 6.25 0.38 2219 0.86 6.25 0.52
WG-5(Deci) 1666 2 .198 6.25 0.27 2492 0.92 6.25 0.43
Table 6.2: Area and performance of WG-5
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From the above results we conclude that WG-5 cipher is a lightweight stream cipher and it
can be used for RFID applications. In the next section, we propose RFID mutual authentication
protocol based on WG-5 cipher design.
6.6 WG-5 in RFID mutual authentication protocol
In this section, we discuss mutual-authentication protocol based on WG-5 stream cipher. The
proposed protocol is in fact an instance of the private and efficient protocol discussed in [19].
To avoid the DoS attacks, the server stores and updates for each and every tag, a pair of potential
current key pair (Kold, Knew) for the tag. The protocol acts as follows; First we assume that the
RFID system consists of RFID reader, tag and the server. Tag carries 80-bit secret key k0 and a
unique IDi.
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Figure 6.6: RFID Mutual authentication protocol using WG-5
Step1: The reader sends request along with an 40-bit random nonce Rr to the tag.
Step2: Upon receipt of Rr the tag generates random nonce Rt of length 40-bit, computes
the initial vector IV = Rr ‖ Rt. Now tag uses IV and 80 bit secret key k0 as inputs to the
WG5func and generates the keystream bits of length 160 bits. The tag outputs WGt of length 40
bits and sends (WGt, Rt) to the reader.
Step3: The reader tries all tag IDi and key ki stored at the server end until it finds WG ′t =
WGt. Generally, the reader checks the MSB bit of the generated keystream sequence, if it
matches, then it checks the further keystream bits of sequence. Suppose MSB bit is not matching
then it stops generating further keystream bit sequence and selects the new key.
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Step4: Upon authentication of the tag, the reader updates the current pair associated with
tag to (k′0,WG
′
s). In order to authenticate reader, it generates WG
′
r of length 40-bits and sends
it to tag.
Step 5: Once, the tag receives WG ′r, the tag checks whether WGr = WG
′
r, if it is then,
the reader is authenticated successfully. After reader is authenticated, the tag updates its current
key value k0 to WGs. Now the reader and tag are said to be mutually authenticated.
6.6.1 Security and privacy analysis of the current protocol
In this section we discuss various security and privacy analysis of our protocol.
6.6.1.1 Man in the middle attack
Rr
TagReader
Rt  , WGt
Adversary
WG'r
Figure 6.7: Man-in-the-middle attack
An adversary can listen and modify the communication between a genuine tag and the reader as
shown in figure 6.7. Thus, it has access to theRr, Rt (random challenges which form the IV) and
WGr(K, IV ), WGt(K, IV ) (the responses from the reader and the tag respectively). But the ID
of the tag and the secret part of the WG-5 stream cipher, i.e. WGs are never exchanged, not even
in the encrypted form. We cannot stop the adversary from knowing whether tag authentication


























Figure 6.8: Replay attack
In previous section, it is clear that, how the adversary may launch a man in the middle attack and
observe the exchange of bits between a genuine tag and the reader. Even it can also determine
whether the authentication was successful and key was updated or not. Since, the server stores
a pair of old and new key values, the adversary may try to attack the previously authenticated
values i.e. Rt and WGt and try to use them for future communications. To overcome this issue,
the reader will provide the random nonce Rr and IV = Rr ‖ Rt so that the IV will change.
As a result of that the value of WGt stored with the adversary will be rendered useless. The






  Key   IV= Rr ||Rt   Key   IV= Rr ||Rt
Figure 6.9: Impersonation attack
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An adversary will try to impersonate a tag or a reader while communicating with a genuine reader
or a genuine tag as shown in figure 6.9. To do so, it has to compute the tag response WGt or the
reader response WG ′r which are required to confirm the authentication. Thus, without knowing
the key, it is impossible for the adversary to compute these values.
Since direct attacks will not be effective, the adversary will try to run it in two phases. In
the first phase it will collect some values of WGt and WG ′r, which will be used to construct a
distinguisher D. The queries and responses will be stored by the distinguisher D. Then the final
authentication attempt will be done by the adversary and for this it will use the distinguisher D
to predict the required WG-5 response.
Most of the distinguisher’s are differential or algebraic in nature. A differential attack
would require at least 217.32 or 222.32 continuous bits from the stream cipher output. Our pro-
tocol doesn’t exchange the last 80 bits of every output hence, we believe that the differential
distinguisher will not work against our protocol. Algebraic distinguisher’s rely on the initial-
ization outputs of the stream cipher and in practical applications, initialization output will be
suppressed. Thus, the algebraic attacks will be rendered ineffective against our protocol.
Overall, WG-5 function has the randomness property i.e. no distinguisher can distinguish
it from a random stream of bits. Thus, a two phase impersonation attack is unlikely to succeed.
6.6.1.4 Tampering
An adversary can tamper with the tag and know its internal state which is the key of the WG
cipher function. In the worst case scenario, even if the adversary knows this key, it cannot
predict any transaction it observed in the past (and its WG-5 function). This is because of the
fact that, after every successful authentication the key gets updated thus, for any authentication
which occured in the past, the adversary has no means of computing the key.
6.6.1.5 Forward privacy
We observe that, an adversary will be able to link the tags internal state with the immediate failed
authentication. This means that, an adversary may be able to track the tag after tampering, as
long as it doesn’t have a successful authentication with a genuine reader. Once that is done, the
key will be updated and adversary will once again lose the track of the tag.
An adversary may observe two tags of the system at a given time, saving the random
challenges and computed responses. If the tags go out of range and then one of the tags interacts
with the adversary, the adversary cannot distinguish between the two. Nor, it can even predict
(or confirm) if the tag is actually one of the two. This is supported by the pseudo-randomness
property of the WG-5 function.
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6.6.1.6 Denial of service(DoS)
An adversary acting like a man in the middle can block communications from either the tag or
the reader to simulate a denial of service. But we believe that, the exposure time is bounded by T,
that is after some time the adversary will be unable to interfere and the tag will have a successful
authentication with a genuine reader. Rather than temporary DoS, the adversary would try to
remove the tags key from the pairs stored on the server’s side.
6.6.1.7 De-synchronization
A man in the middle adversary will wait for the reader to authenticate the tag and send its re-
sponse i.e. WG ′r. The tag will update its key from Ko to K1 = WGs only if the reader sends
the right response. The adversary may drop WG ′r and send some dummy response as shown in
figure 6.10 (a). The tag will not be able to verify the reader and update its key. Thus, the key pair















Figure 6.11: Tag recovery from attack
This still doesn’t desynchronize the tag from the system. If the tag has an authentication
exchange with a genuine reader, it will be able to identify the tag, thanks to the old key K0 being
stored in the server key pair (K0, K1). Once the exchange is successful as shown in figure 6.11,
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the tag key will be updated to K2 and the server key pair will be updated to (K0, K2). Notice
that the server realizes K1 was never used by tag and discards it.
If the second exchange is again overtaken by an adversary and reader’s response is cor-
rupted, the tag’s key is kept at K0 and the server key pair becomes (K0, K2). Hence the tag
is still operable and can make the server discard the key which was never used. The only way
to de-synchronize the tag is to have two successful impersonation attacks, which we have seen
before, is hard to achieve with WG protocol.
Protocol Forward DoS Impersonation Replay Mutual
privacy attack Authentication
S-Protocol [76] No Yes Yes No Yes
EMAP [77] Yes No Yes No Yes
OSK [78] No No Yes Yes Yes
PEP [79] No No Yes Yes Yes
PEPS (WG-5) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6.3: WG-5 Protocol comparison
Therefore, in this section we proposed that, the WG-5 stream cipher based mutual authenti-
cation protocol ensures both security and privacy in RFID tags. The protocol is resistant to DoS,
impersonation, replay attacks and also ensures forward privacy. Table 6.3 shows the comparison
between WG-5 protocol with other existing protocols.
6.7 Comparison of results
In this section, we summarize and compare the ASIC performance of WG-5 implementation,
with other stream and block cipher design results. Most of the stream ciphers that are mentioned
in tables 6.4 and 6.5 were submitted to state-of-the-art stream cipher conferences (SASC) [80]
[60] [81] and eSTREAM project.
Table 6.4 shows the comparison of WG-5 implementation results and its comparison with
other hardware stream and block cipher designs, which were proposed for RFID tags. For the
comparison purpose, we analyzed the cipher design which has the highest level of security of
80 bit key size and below. In addition to the standard design algorithm AES-128, in which
the security is well examined, the new stream cipher design of Grain and Trivium were also
selected for comparison. The other block ciphers KATAN and KTANTAN both consists of block
sizes 32, 48 and 64 bits and 80 bit key size were also considered for comparison. Whereas,
the mCrypton cipher has 64 block size bits with 80 bit key size. Furthermore, we compared
other parameters like the chip area, power consumption, bits per clock cycle, clock frequency,
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throughput and optimality. The results of WG-5 chip area is based on synthesis and are denoted
in gate equivalents (GE). For 130 nm CMOS technology, one gate equivalent is compared to a
2-input NAND gate of 9.9792 µm2. The power consumption mentioned in the fourth column is
denoted in µW which is calculated at a clock frequency of 100 kHz and a supply voltage of 1.5
V. The throughput is calculated for 100 khz and it is measured as bits per cycle multiplied with
clock frequency. The optimality of WG-5 and other cipher is measured as the ratio of throughput
/ Area × power.
The comparison table shows that most of the selected stream ciphers have achieved their
design goals requirement for passive type RFID tags. Grain-80 has less chip area compared
to WG-5. Thus, reduces the overall chip area in terms of GE in Grain-80 whereas, in WG-
5 we have chosen 80-bits for both secret key and IV bits which increases the number of gate
equivalents for the same reason as above. The comparison of other stream ciphers Trivium-
80, F-FCSR-H-80, Decim-80, Edon80, Pomaranch80, Mickey2(80) with WG-5 shows that they
require more number of registers for storing the internal state of the cipher. Although, the power
consumption of WG-5 is higher than the Grain-80, Trivium-80 and Decim-80 but, it is well
below the required goal power consumption for passive type RFID tags. Compared to WG-5,
block ciphers KATAN and KTANTAN have less chip area because in KTANTAN the key is burnt
on device permanently and it is unchangeable. Moreover, KTANTAN is cryptographically not
secure because it is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack [82]. The optimality of WG-5 is
comparatively higher than Trivium-80 and lower than Grain-80 this is due to the selection of
80-bit secret key and 64-bit IV. This suggests that Grain-80 has achieved higher optimality than
WG-5 by compromising its security level.
Table 6.5 shows the other related stream and block cipher results over 90, 180 and 350 nm
CMOS and FPGA technology.
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Cipher Chip area(GE) Power(µW ) Throughput(Kbps) Optimality
@100kHz @100kHz
Grain-80 [60] 1294 3.3 100 2.34
Trivium-80 [60] 2599 5.6 100 0.68
AES-128 [62] 5398 – 237 –
AES-128 [62] 3400 – 1 –
F-FCSR-H-80 [62] 4760 10.58 800 1.58
Decim-80 [62] 2603 5.43 25 0.17
Edon80×4 [62] 4969 10.49 5 0.01
Edon80pl [62] 13010 25.05 100 0.03
Pomaranch80 [62] 5357 16.13 100 0.11
Mickey2(80) [62] 3188 7.10 100 0.44
KATAN-32 [83] 802 381 (nW) 12.5 4.10
KATAN-48 [83] 927 439 (nW) 18.8 4.54
KATAN-64 [83] 1054 555 (nW) 25.1 4.29
KTANTAN-32 [83] 462 146 (nW) 12.5 18.53
KTANTAN-48 [83] 588 234 (nW) 18.8 13.66
KTANTAN-64 [83] 688 292 (nW) 25.1 12.49
mCrypton-64 [84] 2420 – – –
WG-5 1729 6.03 100 1.00
WG-5 (Deci) 1838 6.18 100 0.9
Table 6.4: Comparison of WG-5 with other Hardware ciphers in 130 nm
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Cipher Technology Chip area (GE) Current(µA), Power(µW ) Throughput
@100kHz
STREAM CIPHERS
Grain-80 [12] 0.35 µm 3360 0.80µA –
Trivium-80 [12] 0.35 µm 3090 0.68µA – –
Edon-80 [85] 0.35 µm 2922 – 2.18 Mbps
Quad-128 [86] 90 nm 2961GE – –
(Virtex 4 (85 slices)
Xilinx
FPGA)
E0 [87] Xilinx 1902 0.77 mW 93 Mbps
FPGA
BLOCK CIPHERS
AES-128 [64] 0.35 µm 3400 4.5µW 9.9 Mbps
AES-128 [65] 0.25 µm 3900 1.94µA –
Present [88] 0.35 µm 999.52 3.39µA 11.4kbps
Present [89] 0.18 µm 1570 5µA 200 kbps
DES-64 [56] 0.18 µm 2309 1.19 µA 5.55 Kbps
DESL-64 [90] 0.18 µm 1848 0.89 µA 5.55 Kbps




In this thesis, we proposed the design of lightweight stream cipher WG-5 which is cryptographi-
cally secure and can be used for a resource-constrained applications such as low-cost RFID tags.
As it was mentioned earlier that, passive type RFID tags have stringent requirements in terms of
chip area and available power supply. The constrained design goals need more attention towards
the tailored security solutions for passive type RFID tags. Thus, the lightweight cryptography
systems are in high demand.
In chapter 6, we implemented the lightweight stream cipher WG-5 which is a variant of the
WG stream cipher. Since WG cipher contains cryptographic properties, we measured few of the
values related to WG-5 such as period and linear complexity (LC). The LC of WG-5 was 217.32
and it was increased to 222.32 by using 11- decimation value in oder to achieve higher cipher
complexity. Based on both LC values we carried out the security analysis of WG-5 in detail. The
analysis showed that, WG-5 is secure against algebraic, correlation, cube, differential, discrete
Fourier Transform and time-memory-data trade-off attacks.
Further, the implementation of WG-5 was carried out using 65 and 130 nm CMOS tech-
nology. For the purpose of WG-5 core implementation, normal basis representation was used
to make squaring operation simpler because in normal basis it is just a wire shifting. For the
multiplication operation parallel based multiplier which is purely combination circuitry consists
of AND gates and XOR gates was used. The number of parameter such as chip area, power,
throughput and optimality were calculated for WG-5 using with and without decimation func-
tions at 100KHz clock frequency in 130 nm CMOS technology. The chip area of WG-5 was
found to be 1838 GE with decimation and 1729 GE without decimation function whereas, the
power consumption was 6.03 and 6.18 µW respectively. The optimality of WG-5 was calculated
as 1.00 and 0.9 respectively. Compared to the WG-5 core and FSM, the 32-stage fibonacci feed-
back style LFSR utilized more number of hardware resources in terms of area and power. The
implementation results of WG-5 in 130 nm showed that, it meets the design goals for the pas-
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sive type RFID tags. Further, we compared 130 nm results with other existing stream and block
ciphers which were submitted to eSTREAM 2007 and SASC. This comparison shows that, the
optimality of WG-5 is more than Trivium-80, F-FCSR-H-80, Decim-80, Edon80pl, Edon80×4,
Pomaranch80, Mickey2(80) and the security level of WG-5 is more than Grain-80, Katan and
Ktantan. This clearly suggests that taken together both the optimality and security level WG-5
outperforms many of the ciphers.
Next we proposed, the RFID mutual authentication protocol based on WG-5 stream cipher
in section 6.6. The security and privacy analysis of the protocol showed that, it is resistant to
DoS, impersonation and replay attacks. The comparison of our protocol with other existing
protocols suggested that, it offers mutual authentication and ensures forward privacy. Putting
together, implementation of WG-5, its verified security analysis and the proposed RFID protocol
suggest that, WG-5 is a promising candidate for the passive type RFID tags.
7.1 Future work
It was noticed that, the power consumption of WG-5 is higher compared to the top stream cipher
contenders Grain and Trivium. Future work can concentrate on reducing the power consumption
of WG-5 by using one of the optimization techniques such as clock gating. Furthermore, for the
proposed mutual authentication protocol using WG-5 we can measure the tag computation such
as transmission rate, response time and writing the data into tags memory which influences the
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